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Abstract 
Enron has become a symbol: a symbol of excess, an illustration of how a 
company can base its business on fraudulent, deceptive or even largely non-
existent business transactions.  The collapse of Enron had a significant impact on 
the adoption of legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was intended to 
prevent the types of fraudulent behavior that occurred at Enron.  However, 
Sarbanes-Oxley and other responses to the business practices of many companies 
during the late 1990s do not fully address some of the underlying factors that 
permitted and in fact encouraged the Enrons of the world to represent their 
companies in a particular fashion.  Such legal interventions further do not 
address underlying factors rooted in the fact that many companies now operate 
within the context of knowledge economy intangibles paradigm business 
practices.  Current securities law disclosure frameworks are largely based on an 
implicit assumption about the nature of companies’ business operations.  Such 
frameworks were developed during a time period in which the principal business 
model was one based on the exploitation of tangible assets.  Since the latter half 
of the twentieth century and the advent of the knowledge economy or digital era, 
an increasing number of companies have begun operating under businesses 
models in which the predominant source of value comes from intangible 
resources.  As a result of this fundamental change in business models, an 
intangibles “haze” has come to characterize the application of securities 
disclosure and accounting rules.  This intangibles haze has meant that securities 
disclosures made by such companies, particularly as reflected in financial 
statements such as balance sheets, increasingly do not reflect underlying 
economic reality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In some ways the history of Enron reflects a standard story of corporate fraud and 
malfeasance in which certain officers intentionally misrepresented the nature of 
the company’s business and practices.  This fraud was reflected in Enron’s 
securities disclosure, including Enron financial statements.  This version of the 
Enron saga leaves out an important element of the broader business context within 
which Enron operated.  This aspect of the business context relates to the changing 
nature and sources from which companies now derive value today.  Another way 
to read the Enron story is to consider the fact that companies today operate in a 
post-industrial knowledge economy that is largely based on the use and 
exploitation of intangible assets such as information technology, research and 
development, brand equity and intellectual property rights.1 Existing securities 
disclosure frameworks were developed in the context of companies that operated 
under a tangible industrial business model in which tangible assets such as 
property, plant and equipment were the predominant source of value.  Current 
securities disclosure frameworks and the accounting regimes incorporated within 
such frameworks fail to address the full implications of this new intangibles 
paradigm that is a key characteristic of knowledge economy business worldview 
and practice.  This failure represents an important and often omitted aspect of the 
story of not only of Enron and other cases of corporate fraud in the late 1990s, but 
more importantly of many corporations operating in today’s business 
environment. 
The history of Enron reflects an extreme example of the types of behaviors that 
are made possible and even encouraged as a result of an accounting and 
disclosure “haze” that currently surrounds intangibles.2 Enron’s public discourse 
focused on presenting the company as at the forefront of the knowledge economy: 
[W]e are participating in a new economy, and the rules have changed 
dramatically. What you own is not as important as what you know. Hard-
wired businesses, such as energy and communications, have turned into 
knowledge-based industries that place a premium on creativity. Enron has 
been and always will be the consummate innovator because of our 
 
1 ADAM B. JAFFE & MANUEL TRAJTENBERG, PATENTS, CITATIONS AND INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW 
ON THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 1 (2002) (“In the last few decades we have experienced what have 
come to be called the ‘information age’ and the ‘knowledge economy’ . . . it is now 
‘knowledge’—not labor, machines, land or natural resources—that is the key economic asset 
drives long-run economic performance.”). 
2 See Baruch Lev, Where Have All of Enron’s Intangibles Gone?, 21 J. ACCOUNTING & PUB.
POL’Y 131, 132 (2002) (discussing the role of intangibles at Enron). 
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extraordinary people. It is our intellectual capital—not only our physical 
assets—that makes us Enron.3
Although Enron aggressively advanced itself as a “new economy” knowledge-
based company within the intangibles paradigm,4 the reality was quite different, 
and Enron did not actually have many intangible assets.  Enron’s required 
securities disclosures, however, did not always clearly illustrate this fact, at least 
partly because Enron was quite effective in taking advantage of the fact that 
current securities disclosure and accounting requirements do not fully or 
adequately address how companies should treat intangibles.  This omission 
facilitated Enron’s ability to present a fundamentally inaccurate representation of 
the economic reality of its business and business operations.  The ability of Enron 
and other companies to represent economic reality in such an inaccurate fashion is 
exacerbated by the mismatch between intangibles paradigm business practices 
and tangibles paradigm regulatory standards. 
Enron demonstrates one strategy that companies have used to emphasize the role 
of intangibles in their business operations by means of what might be termed 
intangibles paradigm discourse.  Intangibles paradigm discourse may be 
characterized as a manner of communication about intangibles such as 
information technology and intellectual property that emphasizes the role of such 
intangibles in business organization and practice.5 Through use of such discourse, 
Enron took advantage of the lack of fit between disclosure requirements and 
business practices.  Enron and other companies have thus benefited from the fact 
that current securities disclosure and accounting rules currently require only 
limited disclosure with respect to intangibles.6
A significant commentary exists, in the accounting field in particular, concerning 
the implications of intangibles for accounting frameworks.7 From a legal 
perspective, much has been written concerning the link between recent cases of 
corporate fraud and questionable accounting practices,8 as well as the implications 
of information and communication technologies (ICTs) for existing securities 
 
3 Letter to Shareholders, Enron 1999 Annual Report 2 (2000) at 
http://www.enron.com/corp/investors/annuals/annual99/pdf.html.
4 See infra notes 123 to 258 and accompanying text for discussion of the intangibles paradigm.   
5 See infra notes 349 to 383 and accompanying text for additional discussion concerning Enron’s 
intangibles paradigm discourse. 
6 See Baruch Lev, Sharpening the Intangibles Edge, 82 HARV. BUS. REV. 109, 112 (June 2004) 
(noting that GAAP does not require meaningful disclosure from companies about intangibles 
investment except for aggregate research and development expenditures). 
7 See infra notes 265 to 331 and accompanying text. 
8 See, e.g., infra notes 33, 358, 363, 366, 382 and 404 and accompanying text. 
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regulation frameworks.9 This Article seeks to mediate between these existing 
discourses in the legal and accounting fields by drawing attention to the fact that a 
fundamental paradigm shift in business organization and practice became 
apparent in the latter half of the twentieth century.  Although many of the 
elements of this paradigm shift are at least implicitly recognized in some existing 
accounting and legal commentary, this Article examines some of the specific 
ways in which evidence of this paradigm shift is apparent as well as the effects of 
this shift for business organization and practice.   
This Article focuses on the fact that a common key element underlying issues 
discussed by commentators from the legal and accounting fields is perceptible 
changes in business organization and practices under the intangibles paradigm.  
This changing business environment has facilitated the “creative” accounting 
practices that came to typify the securities disclosure and accounting presentations 
of many companies during the Internet boom of the late 1990s,10 and which may 
have even facilitated fraud at companies such as Enron.  These creative 
accounting practices are facilitated by the current ways in which existing 
regulatory structures have approached the intangibles paradigm.  As a result, a 
key element in confronting the reality of the intangibles paradigm will be the 
development of regulatory structures that truly incorporate recognition and 
understanding of the implications of the intangibles paradigm for actual business 
practice.11 
The implications of changing business practices for securities disclosure and 
accounting frameworks are quite significant.  Although accounting deals with 
numbers, which seem fixed and determinate in the minds of many, accounting 
decisions often involve both art and science and include choices about 
 
9 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities 
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 747 (1985) (discussing the influence of information 
technology on securities regulatory frameworks); Richard J. Miller & Michael R. Young, 
Financial Reporting and Risk Management in the 21st Century, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1996 
(1997) (noting that law has continued to develop to accommodate technological innovation); Paul 
D. Cohen, Securities Trading via the Internet, 4 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 1 (1999) (noting that 
new technology requires new regulatory approaches); Daniel Everett Giddings, Comment, An 
Innovative Link between the Internet, the Capital Markets, and the SEC: How the Internet Direct 
Public Offering Helps Small Companies Looking to Raise Capital, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 785, 788 
(1998) (discussing Internet direct public offerings); Nancy C. Libin & James S. Wrona, The 
Securities Industry and the Internet: A Suitable Match?, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 601, 602-04 
(discussing the implications of the Internet for the securities industry); Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet 
Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 69, 70 
(1998), (noting that the Internet “offers new methods for offering and selling securities”). 
10 See infra notes 334 to 345 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 388 to 421 and accompanying text. 
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characterizations and framing that can be flexible.12 Part I of this Article focuses 
on the operation of securities disclosure and accounting rules in contemporary 
business contexts and the fact that companies often have and exercise choices 
about how to frame and present financial and operational data.  Part II discusses 
the intangibles “paradigm” and moves to specific consideration of the relationship 
between securities disclosure and accounting frameworks and business 
organization, characteristics of the intangibles paradigm shift and the implications 
of the intangibles paradigm for accounting systems and business practices.  Part 
III looks at the intangibles “haze” resulting from the intangibles paradigm.  This 
haze involves uncertainty about the extent to which accounting treatment of 
intangibles adequately represents the underlying economic reality of business 
practices and transactions under the intangibles paradigm and the potential 
ramifications of such uncertainty.  Part IV touches on additional legal issues, 
including ones related to corporate governance in the intangibles paradigm.  Part 
V assesses the regulatory implications of the intangibles paradigms and makes 
suggestions for how to incorporate better recognition of the intangibles paradigm 
into existing regulatory structures. 
I. SECURITIES DISCLOSURE AND ACCOUNTING CHOICES: THE FLEXIBILITY OF 
COMPANY PRESENTATIONS 
A. The Challenges and Economic Importance of Intangibles 
The intangibles haze is compounded by the ever increasing magnitude of 
intangibles.  Although the current magnitude of intangibles in the broader 
economy is difficult to know with precision, one estimate suggests that at least 6 
to 10 percent of United States gross domestic product is spent annually on 
intangibles.13 Annual investment in intangibles has been estimated to be at least 
 
12 See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 9 (2005) 
(“[A]ccounting is an art, not a science.  While lawyers may think of GAAP as a single set of rules 
that must be followed, it is perhaps better to think of it as a set of standards that leave considerable 
discretion for management and its accountants to choose the method of reporting some 
transactions.”); DAVID F. HAWKINS, CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING AND ANALYSIS: TEXTS 
AND CASES v (3d ed. 1986) (“Today corporations have considerable leeway in how they report 
their financial condition and results of operation.  Despite recent progress in eliminating 
undesirable reporting practices, many areas remain in which alternative practies are equally 
acceptable for reporting essentially identical business situations.  The profits of the reporting 
company will vary depending on which alternative is used.”). 
13 Leonard Nakamura, What is the U.S. Gross Investment in Intangibles? (At Least) One Trillion 
Dollars a Year! 4 (Oct. 2001), Working Paper No. 01-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
at http://www.phil.frb.org/files/wps/2001/wp01-15.pdf; M.M. Croes, Data for Intangibles in 
Selected OECD Countries (Dec. 2000), Statistics Netherlands (comparing intangibles data in 
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$1 trillion, with an estimated current equilibrium value of intangibles of more 
than $5 trillion.14 This suggests that some one-third of the value of corporate 
assets in the United States comes from intangibles.15 Intangibles now also 
constitute on average 60 to 75 percent of corporate market value.16 
The fact that intangibles are an increasingly important source of value for 
companies today reflects a shift in dominant business production and operation 
models to ones involving significant utilization of intangibles.17 Intangibles have 
become important largely as a result of economic factors that have intensified 
since the mid-1980s, particularly increased competition resulting from 
globalization and deregulation and an upsurge ICTs.18 
As a result of these changes, a significant number of businesses now operate 
under a paradigm based on accumulation and utilization of intangibles,19 both 
alone and in conjunction with tangible assets or products, whereas prior to this 
shift, most businesses operated under a tangible asset paradigm.20 In addition to 
 
several OECD countries), at 
www.cbs.nl/nl/publicaties/publicaties/bedrijfsleven/algemeen/OECDezRapp.pdf  
14 Nakamura, supra note 13, at 1, 5. 
15 Id.
16 See Letter from Baruch Lev to Representative S.J. “Billy” Tauzin, Chairman, Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 4, 2002), at 
http://pages.stern.ny.edu/~blev/. 
17 See infra notes 124 to 236 and accompanying text.   
18 See infra notes 123 to 258 and accompanying text for discussion of this paradigm shift.  See 
also BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES 9 (2001) (discussing the factors underlying increased 
competition); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter, “OECD”), 
Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Industrial Performance and Competitiveness in 
an Era of Globlalisation and Technological Change 3 (Jun. 9, 1998), DSTI/IND(97)23/FINAL, at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/15/2390669.pdf. 
19 As used herein, the term paradigm reflects and is based upon the model of scientific worldview 
and practice based on paradigm shifts developed by Thomas Kuhn.  See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE 
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed., 1970). 
20 See Jan-Erik Gröjer & Ulf Johanson, Voluntary Guidelines on the Disclosure of Intangibles: A 
Bridge Over Troubled Water? 2, at www.fek.su.se/home/bic/meritum/download/Volunt.doc; J. 
Bradford DeLong, Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Sustaining U.S. Economic Growth, in 
AGENDA FOR THE NATION 19, 20 (H. Aaron, et al.eds., 2003), at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~goldin/papers/dgk_brook.pdf; Leonard Nakamura, 
Intangibles: What Put the New in the New Economy, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA 
BUSINESS REVIEW 3 (July/Aug. 1999); Claudia Goldin, Labor Markets in the Twentieth Century 
50, National Bureau of Economic Research (April 28, 1998) (stating that human capital 
accumulation and technological _________ in the twentieth century plays the role that physical 
capital accumulation played in nineteenth century in serving as the engine of growth), at 
http://econweb.fas.harvard.edu/~goldin/papers/labor20th.pdf; Lionel Nesta & Pier Paolo Saviotti, 
Intangible Assets and Market Value:  Evidence from Biotechnology Firms 3 (2003), at 
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increased use of intangibles in the production of goods and services, an expansion 
has also occurred in the consumption of goods that are themselves nonphysical, 
such as digital products, services and entertainment.21 
The dominant nineteenth century model of industrial production, which persisted 
well into the twentieth century, was founded on the use of economies of scale and 
mass production based on exploitation of physical assets.22 Some argue that the 
electronics revolution that began in the 1970s led to an increase in intangibles, at 
least partly because the electronics revolution made intangibles investment more 
remunerative.23 
Consequently, included within and closely associated with the intangibles 
paradigm is the increasingly dominant ICT sector.24 Although increased 
investment in intangibles has emerged as a core feature of the ICT sector, the 
intangibles phenomenon is broader, and intangibles have become associated with 
 
http://www.mot.chalmers.se/dept/idy/workshop2003/nestasaviotti.pdf (noting that intangible 
capital has overtaken physical capital since 1950s). 
21 See Charles Goldfinger, Understanding and Measuring the Intangible Economy: Some 
Suggestions for Further Research 4 (Aug. 1, 1997), CIRET Seminar, Helsinki, at 
http://www.gefma.com/Francais/Present-fr/Intangibles%20research%20CIRET.doc (noting 
consumption of nonphysical goods). 
22 See Gröjer & Johanson, supra note 20, at 2; DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 37-38; Nakamura, 
supra note 13, at 6-9 (noting that historically tangible assets were the resources that produced 
wealth); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the 
Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1990) (Review of PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1989)) (“The United States has 
witnessed a steady decline in heavy manufacturing, while the industries most affected by 
intellectual property law—such as entertainment and computer software—have flourished.”). 
23 See DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 19; Nakamura, supra note 13, at 5; see also OECD, supra 
note 18, at 3 (indicating that core mechanism of new model is increasing returns on knowledge 
across broad spectrum); Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin M. Hitt & Shinkyu Yang, Intangible Assets: 
How the Interaction of Computers and Organizational Structure Affects Stock Market Valuations 
4, at http://grace.wharton.upenn.edu/~lhitt/itqo.pdf (finding in empirical study that each dollar 
invested in computers is associated with an increase in firm market valuation of $5 to $20 as 
compared with an increase of $1 for investments in other areas and that high information 
technology user firms were more likely to adopt modified business organization and work 
practices, which increased firm value of certain technology intensive companies beyond what 
would be accounted for by tangible assets alone). 
24 Goldfinger, supra note 21 (exploring hypothesis that complementary relationship between new 
intangible organization assets and information technology capital parallels that of memos and 
filing systems and the printing press and factory redesign and the adoption of electric motors); see 
also DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 37-38; Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 23, at 2. For further 
discussion of how intangibles may be defined, see infra notes 34 to 45 and accompanying text. 
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increased business value for both ICT and non-ICT intensive companies and for 
uses both involving and not involving ICTs.25 
As intangibles have become increasingly pervasive, the challenges such resources 
pose for existing systems and practices have become all the more apparent.  
Further, questions have arisen that are not yet resolved regarding how such 
resources should be treated under existing regimes and systems of measurement 
such as securities disclosure requirements, accounting rules, intellectual property 
laws and national income accounting systems.26 Such regimes and systems were 
not developed in contemplation of the current business environment in which 
intangibles form a critical core.27 As a result, the advent of intangibles has 
diminished the effectiveness of certain regulatory systems and checks.28 
With the rise of intangibles has thus come a certain level of confusion as to how 
existing categories, rules and regulations initially drawn up in the context of a 
tangibles paradigm should apply under an intangibles paradigm. This confusion is 
evident in the application of legal rules, including intellectual property and 
securities laws, as well as in the accounting area.29 Although existing securities 
disclosure and accounting practices may be applied in this new intangibles 
oriented context, new regulatory systems to deal with the implications of 
intangibles and ICTs have not been developed.30 
25 See James Guthrie, Ulf Johanson, P.N. Bukh & P. Sánchez, Intangibles and the Transparent 
Enterprise: New Strands of Knowledge, 4 J. INTELL. CAPITAL 429, 429 (2003).  
26 See generally Lev, supra note 18 (giving general overview of the role of intangibles largely 
from an accounting and policy perspective); see also Bart van Ark, Understanding Productivity 
and Income Gaps in the OECD Area:  Are ICT and Intangibles the Missing Link, Groningen 
Growth and Development Centre and the Conference Board (March 2002) (discussing the extent 
to which ICT and intangibles may explain gaps in labor and productivity national income 
statistics). 
27 See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Quality Information: The Lifeblood of Our Markets (Oct. 1999), Speech 
at Economic Club (noting that as intangibles become more important questions have arisen about 
whether existing disclosures standards reflect the true value of intangibles as drivers of value), at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch304.htm. 
28 See infra notes 299 to 331 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 266 to 331 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue with respect to 
accounting; see also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Strategic Behaviors and Competition: Intangibles, 
Intellectual Property and Innovation (2006) (manuscript on file with author) (discussing the 
implications of the increasing predominance of intangibles for intellectual property frameworks) 
[hereinafter, “Arewa, Strategic Behaviors”]; Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Securities Regulation of 
Private Offerings in the Cyberspace Era: Legal Translation, Advertising and Business Context, 37 
U. TOL. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (discussing some implications of the cyberspace era for 
private securities offerings). 
30 See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 813, 830 
(2003) (noting that current accounting treatment of intangibles is an historical relic from a tangible 
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Changes have been made in legal and accounting rules as a result of Enron and 
other instances of corporate fraud.  These changes include adoption of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,31 as well as modification of accounting 
requirements with respect the special purpose entities (SPEs) that played such a 
prominent role in Enron’s activities.32 Despite these modifications, the lack of 
attention to issues relating to accounting treatment generally and the changing 
nature and role of intangibles in business practice more specifically, makes such 
reforms unlikely to clear the intangibles haze.33 
B. Defining and Classifying Intangibles 
Intangibles, which include, among other things, information technology, research 
and development, brand equity, intellectual property rights, corporate culture, 
stockholder relations, access to markets, knowledgeable workers and management 
and human resources, are also referred to as knowledge assets and intellectual 
capital.34 Intangibles may include discovery/innovation aspects, such as new 
products and patents, human resources factors such as compensation and work 
practice and organizational capital aspects, which would include Cisco’s web-
based virtual organization, Wal-Mart’s integrated inventory and supply operations 
and Dell’s built-to-order computer distribution channels.35 
Although the term asset is often used to refer to intangibles, many intangibles are 
not accounting assets in the traditional sense.36 A clear lack of consensus exists 
 
asset paradigm in which concern may have existed about booking nonexistent assets and that 
keeping such treatment “in place for decades, while the importance of wealth created by R&D has 
increased, is inexcusable”). 
31 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §7201 
et seq.) (2002) (hereinafter, “Sarbanes-Oxley”). 
32 See infra notes 93 to 94 and accompanying text. 
33 Cf. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus 
Rents, 48 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1023, 1024, 1027 (2003) (noting that an uncertain regulatory 
outcome is likely for Sarbanes-Oxley, which was intended to address the scandals and restore 
confidence in securities markets, but which was a response that essentially regulates the 
accounting profession, while containing “very little direct regulation of accounting treatments and 
audit practice”). 
34 Kenneth L. Kraemer & Jason Dedrick, Strategic Use of the Internet and E-Commerce: Cisco 
Systems, 11 J. STRAT. INFO. SYS. 5, 5 (2002); Michael G. Harvey & Robert F. Lusch, Balancing 
the Intellectual Capital Books: Intangible Liabilities, 17 EUR. MGMT J. 85, 85 (1999). 
35 See David Aboody & Baruch Lev, Research and Development Productivity in the Chemical 
Industry 6-7 (Mar. 2001) (noting that Cisco’s web-based product installation system was estimated 
by Cisco’s Chief Financial Officer to save $1.5 billion over 3 years), at 
www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/chemical-industry.doc. 
36 An accounting asset can be treated as a capital expense and recorded on a company’s balance 
sheet.  See Gregory H. Bentson, Accounting Numbers and Economic Values, 27 ANTITRUST 
Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy 12 
 Draft of 9:27 AM, 3/11/06 
 Do Not Cite or Distribute 
Copyright 2006 
as to how intangible assets should be defined, 37 and how intangibles are classified 
may depend on the person making the definition.38 The most basic definition of 
intangible assets is a negative definition in which intangibles are considered to be 
nonphysical, nonfinancial assets.39 However, a wide range of definitions exists.40 
Most would probably agree that intangible assets are capital assets that lack 
physical substance, but which are likely to yield future benefits.41 A three-fold 
classification of intangibles frequently proposed is one that distinguishes 
structural, human and market intangibles.42 Intangibles may also be embedded 
 
BULLETIN 161, 166 (1982) (noting that assets and liabilities are recorded following an arms-length 
transactions where a change in legal title to goods or the establishment of a legal obligation to pay 
in the future occurs). 
37 Ulf Johanson, Mobilizing Change: Characteristics of Intangibles Proposed by 11 Swedish 
Firms 17 (June 9-10, 1999), International Symposium, Measuring and Reporting Intellectual 
Capital, Experience, Issues, and Prospects, Amsterdam (noting that intangibles are poorly defined 
and any consensus in classifications is the exception rather than the rule). 
38 Id.; see also Croes, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that accountant, managers, policy makers and 
statisticians would define intangible assets differently). 
39 Croes, supra note 13, at 4; Lev, supra note 18, at 8-10 (noting that such nonfinancial, 
nonphysical factors are expected to generate future productive benefits to the individuals or firms 
that control their use and contribute to or are used in the production of goods or provision of 
services). 
40 Magali Demotes-Mainard, Statistical Information on Intangibles 2 (Oct. 6-10, 2003), Voorburg 
Group on Service Statistics 18th Meeting, Tokyo, at 
www.stat.go.jp/english/info/meetings/voorburg/pdf/mag_stat.pdf (noting that this negative 
definition may be a hollow definition); see also GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR,
VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS 15-54 (3d ed. 2000) for a 
comprehensive overview of various types of intangibles. 
41 Leandro Cañibano, Manuel García-Ayuso Covarsí & M. Paloma Sánchez, The Value Relevance 
and Managerial Implications of Intangibles: A Literature Review 10-14 (Mar. 1999) (unpublished 
manuscript) (acknowledging multiple definitions of intangibles and seeing point of agreement as a 
view of intangibles as sources of probable future economic profits, lacking physical substance and 
controlled by a firm as a result of previous events or transactions), at 
www.fek.su.se/home/bic/meritum/download/value.pdf. International Accounting Standard 38, 
issued by the International Accounting Standard Committee, defines an intangible asset as an 
“identifiable nonmonetary asset without physical substance held for use in the production or 
supply of goods or services, for rental to others, or for administrative purposes.”  See International 
Accounting Standard Committee, International Accounting Standard 38, at ¶7 (July 1998) 
(hereinafter, “IAS 38”); see also Hervé Stolowy, Axel Haller & Volker Klockhaus, Accounting for 
Brands in France and Germany Compared with IAS 38 (Intangible Assets: An Illustration of the 
Difficulty of International Harmonisation), 36 INT’L J. ACCOUNTING 147 (2001). 
42 Gröjer & Johanson, supra note 20, at 12; Jason Hurwitz, Stephen Lines, Bill Montgomery & 
Jeffrey Schmidt, The Linkage between Management Practices, Intangibles Performance and Stock 
Returns, 3 J. INTELL. CAP. 51 (2002) (discussing four areas of intangibles assets: human capital, 
organizational capital, customer capital and intellectual property); Jan-Erik Gröjer, Intangibles and 
Accounting Classification: In Search of a Classification Strategy, 26 ACCOUNTING ORG. & SOC’Y
695 (2001) (suggesting ways in which intangibles could be classified). 
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within and interact extensively with physical assets.43 As a result, a clear-cut 
delineation between tangible and intangible assets is not always possible, 
particularly in the ICT arena. 
Part of the reason intangibles are so difficult to define is a consequence of the 
polymorphic and ubiquitous nature of the information or knowledge upon which 
they are often based.44 This is also a reason why so much confusion exists with 
respect to intangibles in the accounting and legal spheres.  Establishing 
boundaries, practices and procedures with respect to resources and assets for 
which definitions vary, potentially significantly, presents certain challenges.45 
These definitional issues have serious implications not only for accounting 
treatment and consequently securities disclosure, but also for the uses of 
intangibles by companies under the intangibles paradigm. 
C. Securities Disclosure Requirements and Accounting Rules 
A major factor in the uncertainty and resulting higher risk for intangibles is the 
fact that the true economic value and nature of intangibles are not adequately 
addressed by financial statements prepared in accordance with United States 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”).  GAAP is the principal 
source of guidance and authority for the preparation of company financial 
statements in the U.S.46 The development of accounting and auditing standards in 
the U.S. has historically included both the SEC and private standards setting 
organizations.  The SEC has largely, although not entirely, ceded responsibility 
for setting accounting standards to private organizations such as the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”),47 whose standards are treated as 
generally accepted under current securities disclosure requirements.48 
43 See Lev, supra note 18, at 7. 
44 Charles Goldfinger, Intangible Economy and its Implications for Statistics and Statisticians, 65 
INT’L STAT. REV. 191, 198 (1997) (“More generally, economists have difficulties coming to grips 
with the polymorphic and ubiquitous nature of information, simultaneously a good, a production 
asset and a market attribute.”). 
45 For a discussion of the implications of this boundary-marking process from a legal perspective, 
see Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29. 
46 Gary Shorter, Auditing and Accounting Regulation: Key SEC Powers 2 (July 8, 2002), 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RS21257 (noting that financial statement 
preparation rules such as GAAP are intended to help ensure that financial data are presented fairly 
and are comparable between firms and industries), at 
http://www.shelby.senate.gov/legislation/leg_pdf/account3.pdf. 
47 See infra notes 55 to 61 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra note 55. 
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The SEC has considerable statutory authority to establish accounting and auditing 
standards.  Both the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) set minimum standards 
for accountants that prepare company financial statements.49 The Exchange Act50 
and the Investment Company Act of 194051 give the SEC authority to set 
accounting standards to be used to prepare required financial statements as well as 
auditing standards.52 In addition, the SEC has promulgated Regulation S-X, an 
extensive body of regulation that governs registrant preparation of financial 
statements.53 
Despite this statutory and regulatory authority and framework, the SEC has 
largely delegated GAAP rule making authority to FASB,54 which is the primary 
authority that makes accounting determinations in the United States.55 As the 
primary accounting rule making authority, FASB is at times subject to heavy 
industry lobbying and pressure with regard to its policies and pronouncements, 
 
49 Section 17(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Items 25 and 25 of Schedule A of the 
Securities Act of 1933 require that the financial statements of registered companies be audited by 
independent public or certified accountants.  See 15 U.S.C. §77aa(25) and (26) (2003); 15 U.S.C. 
§78q (2003). 
50 15 U.S.C. §77s (2003). 
51 See 15 U.S.C. §78q (2003); 15 U.S.C. §80a-30 (2003). 
52 See George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting Before and after 
Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325, 1325 (2003) (discussing SEC authority to set accounting and auditing 
standards); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l and 78m (2003); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9 and 80a-29 (2003) (giving the 
SEC the authority to set auditing standards). 
53 17 C.F.R. §210.3-01 et seq. (2005). 
54 Bratton, supra note 33, at 1037 fn. 49 (“The SEC already has the power to impose accounting 
rules.  The SEC exercises its power only rarely, preferring to leave the job to FASB, which acts 
under the threat of intervention should the SEC’s preferences not be satisfied.”) (citing DAVID R. 
HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 146 (3d ed. 
2001)); Financial RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES AND 
REMAINING CHALLENGES 58-59, General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Oct. 2002) (discussing the relationship between 
the SEC and FASB) (GAO-03-138), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Hawkins, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that the SEC made known very 
early in its existence its expectation that the private sector would assume the main role in 
establishing accounting rules). 
55 See Tracy N. Tucker, It Really Is Just Trying to Help: The History of FASB and Its Role in 
Modern Accounting Practices, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1023, 1018 (2003);  (noting that 
although its authority derives from federal securities law, FASB is a private rule making body); 
see also SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 150 (identifying FASB standards as generally 
accepted for the purposes of federal securities laws); SEC, Policy Statement: Reaffirming the 
Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8221 (reaffirming post-Sarbanes-Oxley that FASB standards are considered generally accepted for 
the purposes of federal securities laws), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm. 
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which in the past has influenced its decisions in connection with accounting 
standards.56 Although the SEC typically defers to FASB, it does at times issue its 
own accounting standards and may impose particular standards for accounting 
statements in SEC filings.57 On the audit side, the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (“AICPA”) has historically largely controlled generally 
accepted auditing standards (“GAAS”),58 which are related to GAAP.59 The 
AICPA was displaced by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”) established under Sarbanes-Oxley.60 
GAAP is an important standard with respect to company financial statements, and 
a statement of compliance with GAAP is a standard part of audited financial 
statements for public and private companies.61 Such audited financial statements 
 
56 See Bratton, supra note 33, at 1033 (noting that the accounting profession “used its influence to 
stifle FASB’s reform initiatives concerning accounting for stock options”); Stephen A. Zeff, 
Evolution of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 27-29, Outline of a presentation at an 
International Symposium on Accounting Standards sponsored by the Ministry of Finance of the 
People's Republic of China, Beijing, July 12, 2004, at 
www.iasplus.com/resource/0407zeffusgaap.pdf (discussing FASB failure, in face of considerable 
opposition from the high technology industry in particular, to issue SFAS 123, which concerned 
expensing of employee stock options, after Congress indicated its intent to put FASB out of 
business if the standard was issued). 
57 Jerry Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities 
Laws, 28 N.C. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 725, 767 (2003) (noting that SEC imposes accounting 
standards through rules and SEC releases); see also SEC, Staff Accounting Bulletin 101 (Dec. 3, 
1999), 17 C.F.R. § 211, at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab101.htm. 
58 Audits are comprehensive reviews and certifications of a company’s financial statements 
conducted by Certified Public Accountants (“CPAs”), who are qualified to conduct audits and 
certify a company’s books and records.  See Markham, supra note 57, at 765-766 (noting that 
audits are conducted by qualified CPAs). 
59 Shorter, supra note 46, at 2-3 (noting that GAAS and GAAP have a complementary 
relationship; audits, which are governed by GAAS, are the expression of an opinion on a 
company’s financial statements, which are normally prepared in compliance with GAAP). 
60 See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 31; see also Benston, supra note 52, at 1325; Perry E. Wallace, 
Accounting, Auditing and Audit Committees After Enron, et al.: Governing Outside the Box 
Without Stepping Off the Edge in the Modern Economy, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 91, 117-120 (2003) 
(discussing the PCAOB and FASB). 
61 An auditor’s opinion is a critical part of audited financial statements, and companies do their 
utmost to ensure that they receive a clean opinion (i.e., without qualification) from their auditors.  
See Hawkins, supra note 12, at 3 (noting that management of a company is responsible for the 
content of financial statements and that statements issued by independent certified public accounts 
reflect the accountant’s personal opinion as to their fairness, degree of conformity with GAAP and 
consistency with accounting practices in previous accounting periods).  Enron’s 2000 Annual 
Report includes such an opinion from Arthur Andersen, which reflects the critical language in an 
auditor’s opinion regarding a company’s financials comply with GAAP.  An audit opinion that 
reflects the language below is considered a “clean” audit opinion.  Arthur Andersen’s Enron audit 
opinion included the following language: “In our opinion, the financial statements referred to 
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form an important and prominent aspect of companies’ required securities 
disclosure.  Company securities disclosures may also include unaudited financial 
statements that are not strictly in compliance with GAAP in quarterly 10-Q 
Reports, for example.62 The exclusion under GAAP from company balance 
sheets of an increasingly large portion of the value of firms, including value 
derived from knowledge, technology, clients, and other factors, is at the core of 
concerns about accounting measurements and consequently securities disclosure 
standards under the intangibles paradigm.63 
The lack of comprehensive disclosure requirements for intangibles has given 
companies greater latitude to represent economic reality with regard to 
intangibles.  Consequently, in addition to being a dominant factor in the market to 
book gap,64 the intangibles paradigm has significantly affected business structure 
and business practice in a multitude of ways.65 Of particular interest is how the 
intangibles paradigm has influenced company representations of economic reality 
in presentations of themselves vis-à-vis public markets and the implications of 
such framing.66 
D. Financial Statement Presentations 
1. Core Aspects of Financial Statement Presentations 
Financial statements are core elements of companies’ representations of the 
economic reality of their business and form an important element of companies’ 
securities disclosure.  In addition, investors and others rely on financial statement 
 
above present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of Enron Corp. and subsidiaries 
as of December 31, 2000 and 1999, and the results of their operations, cash flows and changes in 
shareholders’ equity for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2000, in 
conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States.” ENRON 2000 
ANNUAL REPORT 30 (2001) (hereinafter, “ENRON 2000 ANNUAL REPORT”). 
62 See Huron Consulting Group, A Study of Restatement Matters (Chicago, Huron Consulting 
2002) (noting that an auditor’s association with quarterly financial statements is limited to review 
procedures of less significant scope than the procedures for an audit), available at 
http://huronconsultinggroup.com/uploadedFiles/Huron_RestatementStudy2002.pdf. 
63 Steven M.H. Wallman, Intangible Assets, Valuation and Accounting Standards (May 1, 2002), 
Remarks at International Intellectual Property Institute, Washington, D.C. (“GAAP …[is] 
floundering with regard to the question of what to do with intangibles, and it is something which I 
think is starting to become a crisis as opposed to simply an interesting problem to resolve.”), at 
www.iipi.org/activities/forums/Assets_Presentation_Transcript.pdf. 
64 See infra notes 164 to 187 and accompanying text. 
65 See generally JUERGEN H. DAUM, INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND VALUE CREATION (2003); 
Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 23. 
66 See infra notes 188 to 208 and accompanying text. 
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presentations in evaluating companies for investment and other decisions.  The 
basic financial statements of companies are generally standardized, with the 
balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement being important aspects 
of most financial statement presentations.  These standard accounting statements 
are incorporated into securities disclosure requirements by virtue of Regulation S-
X, which requires that registrants file certain specified financial statements, 
including balance sheets,67 income statements,68 cash flow statements69 and 
statements of changes in stockholders’ equity.70 
In general, balance sheets are statements as of a specified point in time that 
describe the assets and liabilities of a company.71 Balance sheets are indicative of 
a company’s liquidity, solvency and financial flexibility.72 In contrast, income 
statements cover a specified period of time and describe the sources of revenues 
and expense for a company during that time period.73 Income statements 
generally give an indication of the profitability, investment value and 
creditworthiness of a company’s business operations.74 A cash flow statement, 
which can be derived from the numbers in the balance sheet and income 
statement, reconciles financial statements, which are often based on accrual 
principles, to actual flows of cash in a business operation during a specified 
period of time.75 
In contrast to cash accounting, which records revenues and expenses as cash is 
received or spent, accrual principles would recognize such revenues or expenses 
and record them in financial statements based on certain accounting rules that 
govern accruals.76 These rules often have nothing to do with the time of receipt or 
payment of cash.77 In addition to the actual numbers in the financial statements, 
financial statements are usually accompanied by extensive notes that give further 
detail concerning application of relevant accounting principles and other factors 
 
67 17 C.F.R. §210.3-01 (2005) (outlining requirements for registrant balance sheets). 
68 17 C.F.R. §210.3-02 and 210.3-03 (2005)  (outlining requirements and instructions for registrant 
income statements). 
69 17 C.F.R. §210.3-02 (2005) (outlining requirements for registrant cash flow statements). 
70 17 C.F.R. §210.3-02 (2005) (outlining requirements for registrant statement of changes in 
stockholders’ equity). 
71 DONALD E. KIESO, JERRY J. WEYGANDT & TERRY D. WARFIELD, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 
170 (2004). 
72 Id. at 170-171. 
73 Id. at 124. 
74 Id. at 124. 
75 Id. at 190. 
76 Id. at 93. 
77 Id.
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underlying the numbers that appear in the financial statements.78 The balance 
sheet, income statement and cash flow statement are core aspects of most 
financial statements.  These financial statements, together with their notes, are 
intended to give a fairly complete picture of a company’s business operations.79 
Despite the use of the same core financial statements to measure and depict 
company performance, financial statement presentations are by no means uniform 
and will often vary, for example, depending on the nature and substance of a 
company’s business.  As a result, a venture capital fund’s financial statements will 
typically look different than an operating company’s financial statements in terms 
of the sorts of assets and liabilities that are evident in each and the nature of 
sources of revenues and expenses.80 Similarly, the financial statements of a 
manufacturing company will generally look in terms of types of assets and 
liabilities and sources of revenue and expenses unlike those of a company that 
primarily produces software.81 
2. Framing and Financial Statement Presentations under the 
Intangibles Paradigm 
In addition to variations in financial statements that reflect fundamental 
differences in companies’ businesses and operations, companies may choose to 
represent a given economic or business reality in disparate ways.  The intangibles 
paradigm has intensified pressure on existing fault lines in accounting regimes 
that govern business.  Accounting rules relating to revenue recognition and the 
capitalization or expensing of expenditures, among others, are areas in which 
accounting treatment is particularly significant and frequently material to a 
company’s business operations and stock market valuation.82 As such, companies 
have considerable interest in framing their businesses and operations using 
accounting measures that depict them in the best possible light.  This framing is 
apparent, for example, in how companies manage earnings in order to meet and 
 
78 Id. at 42. 
79 See infra notes 83 to 87 and accompanying text. 
80 A venture capital balance sheet, for example, would typically primarily include assets such as 
cash and portfolio company investments.  A typical operating company would likely have far 
more assets connected to business operations, such as plant, property and equipment, for example. 
81 A manufacturing company is far more likely to have significant amounts of fixed assets such as 
real estate and plant, property and equipment. 
82 This is reflected, for example, in the fact that revenue recognition has been the principal reason 
for financial restatements in recent years.  See Huron Consulting Group, supra note 62, at 10 
(noting that revenue recognition was the leading cause of financial restatements between 1997 and 
2002, causing 20.7% of such restatements, while capitalization and expensing of assets was the 
fifth leading cause, contributing to 7.9% of such restatements). 
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beat analysts’ expectations of earnings and is particularly evident in the 
accounting practices companies use to accomplish this objective.83 
Securities disclosure requirements incorporate accounting rules and practices that 
often give companies some degree of flexibility in how they may characterize 
their business and operations.  The accounting choices a company makes often 
reflect management conceptions about the company’s business model.  Such 
framing occurs in the context of existing accounting rules and standards that are 
used to determine appropriate accounting treatment for a particular transaction.  
The goal of these accounting rules and standards is to present a fair picture of a 
company’s financial condition and operations,84 which may at times be at tension 
with the company’s desire to frame its business operations or a particular 
transaction in a certain manner.   
Choices companies make about accounting treatment are influenced by 
accounting rules as well as companies’ framing of their business and operations 
and consequently representations of economic reality.  The decision as to whether 
to capitalize an expenditure, and place the purchased item on the company’s 
balance sheet, for example, may differ depending on the nature of the expenditure 
and whether the expenditure relates to intangible or tangible goods or services.  
Under current accounting rules, physical property such as buildings are generally 
treated differently than expenditures for intangibles such as the development of a 
web-based virtual organization to handle internal and external business 
operations.85 This differential treatment results in buildings appearing on balance 
sheets as capital expenses, while the majority of the value associated with 
building the virtual organization would most likely be treated as an operating 
expense on the company’s income statement during the time periods in which 
such expenditures occur.86 
83 See Ann Reilly Dowd, How Cooked Books Threaten Directors, CORPORATE BOARD MEMBER 
(Winter 1998), at 1, at http://www.boardmember.com/issues/archive.pl?article_id=10577&V=1. 
84 Christine E. Earley, Kate Odabashian & Michael Wilenborg, Some Thoughts on the Audit 
Failure at Enron, the Demise of Andersen, and the Ethical Climate of Public Accounting Firms,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1013, 1015-1016 (2003) (discussing requirement under GAAP that financial 
statements fairly present the financial condition of a company and its operations); GAO Report, 
supra note 54, at 43 (noting that the “SEC views the integrity of financial reporting as a 
“fundamental building block” of the full and fair disclosure that gives investors confidence in U.S. 
markets.”). 
85 See infra notes 266 to 299 and accompanying text. 
86 See infra notes 272 to 290 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cisco’s virtual 
organization. 
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The consequences of this differential treatment can be illustrated by a simplified 
example.87 For the purposes of this example, assume a company has an income 
statement reflecting $100 in revenues and $50 in expenses in a given time period, 
giving the company $50 in profit during that period, and a balance sheet with 
$100 in assets and $100 in liabilities as of that point in time.  If this company 
were to spend $50 to purchase a building, which is a tangible asset, the accounting 
treatment for the purchase of the building would likely be different from $50 
spent to develop an intangible web-based virtual organization.  In the case of the 
$50 spent to finance the building, assuming that the company takes out a 
mortgage loan for the entire $50 expenditure, the company’s balance sheet would 
change.  The $50 building would now be added as an asset on the balance sheet, 
offset on the liability side by a debt of $50, reflecting the mortgage the company 
has taken out to finance its purchase.  The result would be that the company 
would now have $150 in assets and $150 in liabilities.  In contrast, the company’s 
expenditure of $50 for the web-based virtual organization would not change the 
company’s balance sheet, because the web-based virtual organization, as an 
intangible, would typically be considered an operating expense, not a capital 
expense.  As a result, the $50 spent for the virtual organization would be recorded 
as an expense on the company’s income statement.  This would mean that the 
company would now have $50 in additional expenses or $100 in revenues and 
$100 in expenses, which would mean that the company’s profitability has been 
reduced because where it previously had $50 in profit, it now has $0 profit since 
revenues and expenses are now equal.  This simple example illustrates in a small 
sense the potential variations that may emerge in company financial statements 
just as a result of the relative intensity and scope of intangibles in company 
business operations.  In aggregate, such differences are potentially quite 
significant and in some instances problematic.88 
However, accounting rules also offer companies choices about the accounting 
treatment they use to represent the economic reality of a particular transaction.  In 
the case of a building, a company could buy a building and record it as an asset on 
the company’s balance sheet, offset on the liability side by a debt that might 
reflect a mortgage that the company might have taken out in connection with the 
purchase of the building, for example.  Alternatively, the company could 
transform the characterization of this building for financial statement purposes by 
 
87 This example is simplified in many ways, including in assuming, for example, that no other 
expenses are associated with the building purchase or mortgage, that no tangible assets are 
recorded on the balance sheet as part of the development or the virtual organization and that the 
building does not depreciate. 
88 See infra notes 265 to 298 and accompanying text. 
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constructing a synthetic lease.89 This ability to transform representations of 
economic reality in financial statements has significant implications under the 
intangibles paradigm by virtue of the nature and treatment of intangibles under 
current accounting rules. 
E. Synthetic Leases and Financial Statement Transformations 
1. The Structure and Magnitude of Synthetic Lease Transactions 
A synthetic lease transaction would typically involve a company establishing up a 
third party SPE that would be characterizable as independent from the company 
for financial statement purposes.  Such independence would mean that SPE 
financial statements would not need to be consolidated or combined with the 
financial statements of the company setting up the synthetic lease transaction (the 
“sponsor company”).  By removing this transaction from the company’s balance 
sheet and making it appear “off balance sheet,” the company may be able to keep 
any debt associated with the building purchase from influencing its financial 
ratios.90 SPEs are typically created for the particular transaction or series of 
transactions.91 Prior to the Enron controversy, accounting rules for independence 
for an SPE were generally interpreted by FASB and the SEC to require that 3 
percent of the capitalization of the SPE be comprised of equity contribution from 
an owner not connected to the sponsoring company setting up the SPE.92 In 
addition, the owner of such equity actually needed to be at risk with respect to its 
equity contribution to the SPE.93 Following the Enron controversy, FASB issued 
 
89 See Donald J. Weidner, Synthetic Leases: Structured Finance, Financial Accounting and Tax 
Ownership, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 445, 446 (2000) (“In a synthetic lease transaction, money is 
borrowed based on the financial strength of a tenant of property and on that tenant's agreement to 
pay rent. The lender expects the debt to be serviced from the rental obligation of the tenant rather 
than from the financial resources of the nominal owner and borrower. The lease is ‘synthetic’ 
insofar as it is designed to achieve a blended treatment: the tenant reports it as an operating lease 
for financial accounting purposes but as a mortgage for federal income tax purposes.”) 
90 See infra notes 103 to 107 and accompanying text. 
91 See Weidner, supra note 89, at 448 (noting that SPEs are created solely for the purpose of 
entering into a financing transaction or transactions); Jalal Soroosh & Jack T. Ciesielski, 
Accounting for Special Purpose Entities Revised: FASB Interpretation 46(R), CPA J. ONLINE 
(July 2004) (noting that SPEs are created by a party to carry out a “specific purpose, activity, or 
series of transactions” and “have no purpose other than the transactions for which they are 
created.”), at http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/704/essentials/p30.htm. 
92 Soroosh & Cisielski, supra note 91. 
93 Id.; see also FASB, EITF Issue 90-15 (setting 3 percent as the minimum third-party interest in 
an SPE to avoid consolidation of the SPE with sponsor company financial statements); Bala G. 
Dharan, Financial Engineering with Special Purpose Entities, in ENRON AND BEYOND:
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ACCOUNTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND SECURITIES ISSUES 
103, 114-116 (Julia K. Brazelton & Janice L. Ammons eds., 2002) (discussing changing 
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new criterion increasing the 3 percent standard to 10 percent, although the revised 
rule does not establish a bright-line test.94 
SPEs are widely used by businesses in the U.S., particularly in securitization 
transactions.  A random review of 66 public companies in 2001 found that 
disclosed SPE transactions accounted for close to $230 billion in value, with 92% 
involving securitizations of receivables and the remaining 8% involving leases.95 
These figures may reflect only a portion of actual transactions involving SPEs 
since under current financial statement reporting requirements, SPEs established 
by a sponsor company may remain undisclosed and thus essentially hidden from 
readers of sponsor company financial statements.96 The total size of just the 
synthetic lease market for real estate, equipment and other assets may be as large 
as $600 billion.97 The dangers of undisclosed SPEs are illustrated by Enron, 
which developed thousands of such SPEs as a way to remove and conceal losses 
as well as debts and other liabilities.98 In most cases, however, Enron’s financials 
did not comply with applicable accounting rules.99 The accuracy of 
representations of economic reality in accounting presentations involving SPEs is 
largely dependent on the adequacy and transparency of securities disclosure, the 
nature of the underlying accounting treatment and extent to which such 
accounting treatment is actually disclosed. 
In a typical synthetic lease transaction, an SPE would acquire or construct the 
building and would be the borrower on paper of any mortgage associated with the 
building.100 The SPE would then enter into a short-term lease (usually less than 
 
consolidation rules for SPEs and noting that the 3 percent rule was an ad-hoc solution intended as 
a short term band-aid that subsequently became standard practice). 
94 See Soroosh & Cisielski, supra note 91; see also FASB Interpretation No. 46(R) (Dec. 2003). 
95 See Soroosh & Cisielski, supra note 91. 
96 Id.
97 Dharan, supra note 93, at 107 (noting that estimates of the size of the synthetic lease market 
vary, and that as much as $600 billion in real estate, equipment and other assets may be accounted 
for using synthetic leases in the U.S.). 
98 See generally, BETHANY MCLEAN AND PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE 
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); WILLIAM POWERS, JR., RAYMOND S. 
TROUBH & HERBERT S. WINOKUR, JR., REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (Feb. 1, 2002) 
(hereinafter, “POWERS REPORT”). 
99 See generally POWERS REPORT, supra note 98; Dharan, supra note 93, at 103 (noting that 
Enron’s failure is “a case of SPEs run amok”); Bratton, supra note 33, at 1042 (“Enron’s 
financials would have been out of compliance with GAAP even with its SPEs in compliance with 
the rules on consolidation at all times.”). 
100 Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays:  The Book-Tax 
Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 54-58; Weidner, supra note 89, 
at 447 (“In terms of the desired outcome, a synthetic lease is a transaction in the form of a lease 
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ten years) with the typically high credit rating sponsor company.101 The 
transaction documents between the SPE and the mortgage lender would give the 
mortgage lender “assurance that its debt is secure and provide the corporate user 
[sponsor company] with essentially all of the material benefits and burdens of 
ownership of the real estate including, importantly, the right to capture the benefit 
of appreciation in the value of the property.”102 
This would mean that the company would report less debt on its balance sheet 
than it would without the synthetic lease, all other things equal.103 The synthetic 
lease transaction would enable the company to treat its payment obligations under 
the synthetic lease transaction as a lease obligation that it can footnote as a long 
term rental obligation (operating lease) as opposed to a debt obligation that would 
be reported as a balance sheet liability (capital lease).104 Synthetic leases thus 
allow a particular representation of a certain economic reality for financial 
statement reporting purposes that may permit the sponsoring company to 
transform its depiction of such underlying economic reality.105 The SPE involved 
 
that embodies a blend of characteristics that enables it to be characterized as a lease for financial 
accounting purposes, while also permitting it to be treated as the nominal tenant's mortgage or 
‘financing transaction’ for federal income tax purposes.”). 
101 Luppino, supra note 100, at 447. 
102 Id. at 55. 
103 Id. at 50 (noting that management avoids balance sheet debt because “various ratios used by 
analysts to value companies are negatively affected by high debt”); Weidner, supra note 89, at 
450-51 (“Synthetic leases keep certain assets and liabilities off balance sheet and also improve the 
ratios by which businesses are judged. In general, a business looks less leveraged when it can take 
a long-term liability off its books. In addition, the business may improve certain calculations and 
financial ratios that are often closely monitored. For example, because no asset is booked if a lease 
is classified as an operating lease, the lessee need not take a charge against earnings for 
depreciation. This favorably impacts the share price-to-earnings ratio and the earnings-to-assets 
ratio. In short, by keeping a heavily encumbered asset off the books, a user may preserve a more 
favorable return-on-assets ratio, a more favorable return-on-equity ratio, and a more favorable 
debt-to-equity ratio.”). 
104Luppino, supra note 100, at 57-69.  Compliance with several FASB requirements would need to 
be met for the company to treat the synthetic lease transaction as a lease obligation (operating 
lease) as opposed to a debt obligation (capital lease).  See FASB, Statement of Accounting 
Standards No. 13, Accounting for Leases (Nov. 1976) (hereinafter, “FASB 13”) (discussing 
treatment of capital and operating leases); FASB, Statement of Accounting Standards No. 98, 
Accounting for Leases: Sale-Leaseback Transactions Involving Real Estate, Sales-Type Leases of 
Real Estate, Definition of the Lease Term, Initial Direct Costs of Direct Financing Leases (May 
1988) (amending FASB 13 and other FASB statements) (hereinafter, “FASB 98”); see also 
Weidner, supra note 89, at 454-55 (noting that lessees [sponsor companies] seek to avoid 
application of FASB 98 in constructing synthetic lease transactions since FASB 98 has a stricter 
requirement with respect to debt obligations appearing on the lessee’s balance sheet). 
105 Weidner, supra note 89, at 487 (“Unlike the federal income tax law, the financial accounting 
standards have been less stable and definitely need fixing. Most simply, FASB currently permits 
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in a synthetic lease would not, however, necessarily be independent from the 
company in any real economic terms.  As a result, in contrast to financial 
statement presentation, tax treatment of the synthetic lease would reflect the 
actual underlying economic reality of the transaction,106 and the sponsor company 
would be considered the owner with regard to the tax treatment of any debt 
liability associated with the synthetic lease transaction.107 The differential 
treatment of synthetic leases for book and tax purposes reflects the potentially 
varying ways in which companies can depict a given economic reality in different 
contexts of presentation.  Such differential presentations are by no means limited 
to synthetic leases and other financial statement transformations.108 
2. Synthetic Leases, SPEs and Transforming Representations of 
Economic Reality 
Although SPEs such as those associated with synthetic leases may have a genuine 
underlying business purpose, they can also be entered into with the specific 
accounting goal of removing debt or other liabilities from a balance sheet or 
managing income statement earnings by being able to report gains or losses when 
desired.109 Synthetic leases and other off-balance sheet financing transactions 
 
enormous amounts of debt to vanish from a company's balance sheet. Corporations are permitted 
to appear far less leveraged than they are by recasting mortgages as leases. In a system that prides 
itself on transparency, this transactional sleight-of-hand should not be permitted.”) 
106 The differential tax treatment of synthetic lease transactions and fact that the company would 
generally be considered an owner for tax purposes is indicative of the underlying economic reality 
of the transaction.  The existence and role played by the SPE does not change this fundamental 
economic reality.  Luppino, supra note 100, at 57-59 (discussing tax treatment of synthetic leases); 
Weidner, supra note 89, at 486-87 (comparing financial accounting and tax treatment of synthetic 
leases). 
107 Luppino, supra note 100, at 51, 59 (noting that the tenant (sponsor company) in a typical 
synthetic lease transaction is the owner of the property for tax purposes, enabling the sponsor 
company to use such debt to its benefit for tax purposes, which permits the company to “support 
loss deductions, allow for nontaxable receipts of cash, and, in general, drive tax deferral.”); 
Soroosh & Ciesielski, supra note 91 (noting that synthetic leases serve two important purposes, 
enabling a company to treat a lease as an operating expense, recording payments as rent expense 
while keeping the underlying assets and liabilities off its balance sheet and allowing a company to 
treat the transaction as if it owned the leased property for tax purposes); Dharan, supra note 93, at 
108 (noting that the sponsor company does not have to report the building in a synthetic lease 
transaction as a capital lease because control of the building is held by an SPE whose legal 
structure prohibits the sponsor company from “controlling” it). 
108 See infra notes 189 to 210 and accompanying text. 
109 See Bala G. Dharan, Enron’s Accounting Issues:  What Can We Learn to Prevent Future 
Enrons?, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 113, 117-118 (Nancy B. 
Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2003) (noting that SPEs may serve a number of purposes, 
including hiding debt or poor performing assets, earnings management or quick execution of 
related party transactions at desired prices). 
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facilitated by SPEs highlight important aspects of financial statement rules.  The 
first is that, in addition to having a goal of presenting a fair and accurate picture of 
a company’s finances and operations, accounting rules may be used legitimately 
in such a way as to obscure underlying economic reality. In addition, accounting 
rules have the potential to transform the depiction of this underlying reality by, for 
example, turning an owner of a building into a tenant for financial statement 
reporting purposes.  The extent to which financial engineering or any 
transformative or obscuring representations are apparent to readers of financial 
statements is dependent on how a company chooses to frame its business and 
financial statement presentations, the structure of the transformative transaction 
and the adequacy of the company’s disclosure.110 
Accounting treatment of intangibles more generally illustrates another area where 
securities disclosure requirements and the accounting rules that they incorporate 
may not fully reflect or accurately represent underlying economic reality.  
Intangibles are typically not capitalized and placed on a company’s balance sheet 
and are now a predominant source of value for many companies.  As a result, the 
information that a reader of a financial statement may receive from reading a 
balance sheet, for example, is potentially quite different for companies operating 
under an intangibles as opposed to tangibles paradigm business model.  Under the 
intangibles paradigm, present accounting treatment leads to many of the most 
valuable assets of a company not even appearing on a balance sheet to the extent 
that such value is associated with intangibles.  This is the reason why financial 
statements, particularly balance sheets, have under the intangibles paradigm 
become less informative and less reflective of economic and business 
fundamentals.111 
F. Intangibles and Financial Statements 
Part of the uncertainty in the application of accounting rules to intangibles and 
ICT era business practices is rooted in the nature of intangibles themselves.  Also 
relevant is the fact that existing accounting systems now applied to intangibles 
were developed largely in the context of a business milieu built around a physical 
asset industrial production paradigm.112 Existing accounting systems have been 
 
110 See Dharan, supra note 93, at 103 (noting the “power of SPEs as financial engineering tools”). 
111 See infra notes 317 to 331 and accompanying text. 
112 See H. THOMAS JOHNSON & ROBERT S. KAPLAN, RELEVANCE LOST: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 6-18 (1987) (giving an overview of the historical context of the 
development of accounting systems); see also Peter Walton, International Accounting and 
History, in EUROPEAN FINANCIAL REPORTING: A HISTORY 1, 3 (Peter Walton ed., 1995) (noting 
that the financial reporting world is intimately linked with business environment). 
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characterized as obsolete in light of the changing business context of their use.113 
Current accounting and securities disclosure frameworks are based on 
assumptions rooted in the past about tangibles paradigm business operations that 
are no longer valid for a significant number of companies.114 For example, the 
concept of “cost” inherent in existing accounting systems only makes sense in 
light of costs being viewed under the assumptions of tangibles paradigm 
manufacturing business practices and operations as attaching to a product as it 
flows through a factory.115 This mismatch between tangibles paradigm 
accounting rules and disclosure standards and increasingly prevalent intangibles 
paradigm business operations is a factor in the increasing failure of accounting 
systems to provide accurate information that is reflective of the true economic 
value of a business.116 The divergence between regulatory structures and business 
practice is intensified by the typically incremental nature of change in accounting 
regulation as compared to the relatively rapid nature of changing business 
practices associated with the intangibles paradigm.117 
At the same time, with the intangibles paradigm, a significant amount of value is 
now attributed to intangibles by public markets, which has contributed to strategic 
behavior by businesses with respect to intangibles.118 The ethos underlying such 
behaviors is recreated and reinforced through framing and business discourse at 
two levels: externally in the strategic intellectual property management literature 
and internally by virtue of business documents such as annual reports that position 
companies within the midst of this intangibles paradigm in a way intended to 
maximize company market valuations.119 The strategic intellectual property 
management literature is supplemented and reinforced by such internally 
generated company business documents, which include annual reports, SEC 
filings, company websites and articles in the financial and mainstream press. 
This association between intangibles and business and market value has 
 
113 See Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 183-207. 
114 See Walton, supra note 112, at 1 (noting that “the ensemble of accounting practices and 
regulations in any one country at any given time are not representative of the present but are rather 
an accumulation of past decisions which have been modified in response to many different stimuli 
over a span of time”). 
115 See Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 187 (noting that factory analogy provides the best 
explanation of how the accounting system works). 
116 Id. at 205. 
117 See Walton, supra note 112, at 3 (noting incremental nature of accounting regulation). 
118 See Arewa, Strategic Behavior, supra note 29. 
119 The strategic intellectual property management literature is a body of works in the business 
field that discusses the appropriate uses of intellectual property assets by companies.  See infra 
note 221 and accompanying text.  
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significantly affected how businesses are organized and operate.120 More 
specifically, the changes in business organizational structure and operational 
strategy associated with the intangibles paradigm have implications for systems 
that regulate business behavior.121 The full magnitude of the effects of intangibles 
for business enterprises remains uncertain.122 Assessment of the nature and uses 
of intangibles and the shift to the intangibles paradigm provide further evidence of 
exactly how accounting and other regulatory systems fail to require disclosure of 
information that accurately represents the economic reality of the intangibles 
paradigm economy and business practices. 
II. THE INTANGIBLES “PARADIGM”: THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF BUSINESS 
INVESTMENT 
Intangibles are inherently different from physical and financial assets.  
Managerial and regulatory systems are slow to adapt to these differences, 
resulting in widespread adverse private and social consequences. . .  A 
productive discourse on intangibles should be based on a thorough analysis 
of the economics of intangibles, an understanding of the incentives and 
motives . . . of the major players . . . and a careful empirical documentation 
of the economic consequences of the rise of intangibles.123 
A. Accounting Systems and Business Organization 
1. Tangibles paradigm Business Organization from an Historical 
Perspective 
One critical aspect of the shift to an intangibles paradigm is increased 
 
120 See infra notes 158 to 163 and accompanying text; see also Brynjolfsson et al., supra note 23.  
121 OECD, supra note 18, at 4 (“The development of intangible investments has been 
complemented by the expansion of service activities and extensive organisational change.”); W. 
Michael Cox & Richard Alm, The New Paradigm, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 1999 
ANNUAL REPORT 11-23 (1999) (discussing organizational and other changes associated with ICT 
era), at http://www.dallasfed.org/fed/annual/1999p/ar99.pdf; Baruch Lev & Paul Zarowin, The 
Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend Them 27, NYU Working Paper (Feb. 
1999), at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/boundaries.doc (highlighting the fact that intangibles 
are a major driver of business change). 
122 OECD, supra note 18, at 10 (“Overall, public policy is hampered by lack of knowledge and 
understanding of the extent and importance of intangible assets in enterprise strategies and 
practices.  Intangibles need to be measured, reported and accounted for more explicitly, to 
strengthen their internal management and develop reliable external guides to their value for capital 
markets and resource providers.”). 
123 Lev, supra note 18, at 20. 
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internalization of corporate transactions and sources of value.124 This 
distinguishes the intangibles paradigm from business paradigms that have arisen 
in the past.  Accounting and bookkeeping systems developed to record 
information relating to transactions and existed even in the ancient world.125 The 
nature of the information that accounting systems need to explain may differ 
depending on the dominant organizational paradigms of businesses that use such 
systems.  For example, before the nineteenth century, under a pre-industrial 
business paradigm, the dominant forms of business organization tended to be 
characterized by exchange transactions between owners-entrepreneurs and 
external individuals involving raw material suppliers, piecework labor and 
customers.126 In such a pre-factory system, a piece rate, or market-based price, 
was paid for “the output of independent artisans or subcontractors who carried out 
almost every process involved in the manufacture of a product.”127 
With the tangibles paradigm that came to be ascendant during the Industrial 
Revolution, business owners began to exploit economies of scale to achieve gain 
and commit large sums of capital to production processes with an overall business 
focus on accumulating physical capital.128 This led to a business focus on 
managing hierarchical organizations rather than conducting all business through 
market transactions and is exemplified in the dominant industrial factories that 
emerged under that paradigm in the textile and steel industries, for example.129 
124 See infra notes 282 to 290 and accompanying text. The importance of internally generated 
intangibles is reflective of this phenomenon. 
125 Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 6.   
126 Id. at 6, 19-21.  
127 Id. at 22-23; see also JOEL MOKYR, THE GIFTS OF ATHENA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 121 (2002) (noting that, although large firms were widespread prior to the 
Industrial Revolution, “most of their employees were domestic laborers (working in a cottage 
industry).”). 
128 Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 6-7 (noting commitment of significant sums of capital to 
production processes); Goldin, supra note 20, at 50 (noting focus on accumulation of physical 
capital as characteristic of nineteenth century industrial production). 
129 Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 7, 21-45; see also William L. Baldwin, The Corporation 
and Society: An Evolutionary/Institutional Approach, 27 VT. L. REV. 841, 843-844 (2003) 
(discussing how dominant nineteenth century business models resulted in the demand for forms of 
business organizations that could efficiently manage capital investments and technical economics 
of scale and scope); see also John Richard Edwards & Edmund Newell, The Development of 
Industrial Cost and Management Accounting before 1850:  A Survey of the Evidence, 33 BUS.
HIST. 35, 38, 53  (1990) (placing the origins of industrial accounting in the cotton and metal 
industries and suggesting that precursors of modern accounting frameworks are more varied than 
is often stated); James Foreman-Peck, Accounting in the Industrialization of Western Europe, in 
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL REPORTING: A HISTORY 11-28 (Peter Walton ed., 1995) (discussing the 
relationship between the history of European accounting and economic history, noting that with 
industrial capitalism, developments in accounting were dependent on the goals of management). 
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The emergence of these structures under a tangibles paradigm changed the nature 
of the accounting information that companies needed to operate.130 For example, 
steel magnate Andrew Carnegie’s operating strategy enabled him to make profits, 
even during economic recessions when he cut prices, and outlast competing firms 
that went out of business.131 Management accounting, which entails use of 
accounting information for planning, decision making and control, developed to 
accommodate and support these “profit-seeking activities of entrepreneurs for 
whom multiprocess, hierarchical, managed enterprises were more efficient than 
conversion processes through continual transactions in the marketplace.”132 
Nineteenth century managers of capital intensive companies thus made 
“sophisticated use of accounting information to rationalize the operations of large 
single-activity manufacturing concerns.”133 
The history of the relationship between accounting systems and business 
operations is thus one in which accounting frameworks have often adjusted to 
meet the needs of changing business operational and organizational structures.  
For example, the development of audited financial statements and auditing 
procedures is closely linked to the increased need for companies to raise funds 
from more widespread sources of outside capital.134 Current accounting 
frameworks were basically fully formed by 1925.135 These frameworks have not 
been fundamentally reassessed in light of the implications of the intangibles 
paradigm,136 which is an important factor in the intangibles haze.137 The structure 
and use of intangibles in contemporary business operations demonstrates how 
 
130 Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 6 (noting that a need arose for measures “to determine 
the ‘price’ of output from internal operations,” in order to determine profits). 
131 Id. at 33-34 (noting that Carnegie’s strategy “[w]as to push his own direct costs below his 
competitors’ so that he could charge prices that would always ensure enough demand to keep his 
plants running at full capacity.”). 
132 Edwards & Newell, supra note 129, at 39 (noting that management accounting may be 
distinguished from cost accounting, which focuses on identification and accumulation of cost, and 
financial accounting, which has the goal of providing accounting information to external parties). 
133 Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 35. 
134 Id. at 130 (noting that prior to 1900, although a few American industrial companies issued 
periodic financial statements, virtually none of these financial reports were audited and that firms 
were eventually able to tap outside resources by providing investors with audited financial 
statements). 
135 Id. at 12, 125. 
136 Id. at 14 (“When cost systems became automated on digital computers, starting in the mid-
1960s, the system designers basically automated the manual systems they found in the factory.  
Left unquestioned was whether these systems were still sensible given the great expansion in 
information technology represented by electronic, digital computers and the already changed 
nature of the organization’s operations.”). 
137 See infra notes 265 to 331 and accompanying text. 
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current accounting and disclosure frameworks function in today’s intangibles 
oriented business and economic climate. 
2. Virtual Business Organization: The Case of Cisco 
The use of information systems by Cisco Systems, the world’s largest networking 
equipment company, illustrates some of the organizational and operational effects 
of engagement with the intangibles paradigm in the ICT sector. Cisco’s Internet 
Protocol (IP)-based networking solutions form the foundation of many Internet 
networks worldwide.138 Founded in 1984 by a group of Stanford computer 
scientists, Cisco began operations as a company that made routers, physical 
devices developed at Stanford University that join multiple computer networks 
together.139 Cisco shipped its first product in 1986 and expanded its range of 
product offerings in the 1990s to include switches, which are devices that join 
multiple computers together.  Cisco also grew at an extraordinary rate, with 
annual revenues increasing from $70 million in 1990 to more than $18.9 billion in 
2000140 and $24.8 billion in 2005.141 
Cisco has created “a virtual organization that incorporates its suppliers and 
business partners to make its value chain more efficient.”142 As part of its global 
networked business model, Cisco supports its business strategy by making 
extensive use of the Internet and e-commerce and integrates its customers, 
suppliers, channel partners and service partners into its own information 
systems.143 Cisco describes itself as a “business is based on a networked fabric of 
communications and collaboration that uses Internet applications to improve 
productivity, reduce time to market, increase revenue, and build relationships.”144 
Cisco’s business strategy enabled it to automate routine customer questions 
through use of the Internet and thus more effectively use the time of its engineers 
 
138 Brit Wittman, Cisco Systems Puts its HR Programs and Processes On Line and Reaps Big 
Productivity Gains, 23 J. ORG. EXCELLENCE 43, 43 (2003) (noting that Cisco IP solutions are the 
“foundation of the Internet and most corporate, education and government networks around the 
world”). 
139 Kraemer & Dedrick, supra note 34, at 5.  
140 Id.
141 CISCO 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2005), at 
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac49/ac20/ac19/ar2005/printable.html. 
142 Kraemer & Dedrick, supra note 34, at 26. 
143 Id. at 17, 20. 
144 CISCO 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2000), at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/ac49/ac20/ac19/ac15/about_cisco_annual_report_links_launch
.html.  
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who could then spend time on more challenging technical questions.145 This 
strategy also meant that Cisco could avoid a serious constraint on its growth that 
would have resulted from engineers spending time on routine questions instead of 
supporting Cisco’s sales of its core router and switch products.146 Rather than 
hire new engineers or have existing engineers handle routine customer needs, 
Cisco automated such requests, developing the Cisco Connection Online (CCO), 
Cisco’s virtual organization that extends to all aspects of Cisco’s operations, 
including internal operations.147 Cisco has a virtual finance organization (VFO) 
that permits company management to view financial information through Web-
based applications on a daily and hourly basis.148 
Cisco also uses the Cisco Employee Connection (CEC), an Intranet, internally to 
provide human resources information and support Cisco employees.  Interactive 
tools have been developed for facilities, travel arrangements, technical 
documents, human resources, training, sales and marketing and financial 
matters.149 Cisco has described itself as the “single largest user of e-commerce in 
the world,”150 which reflects the pervasive use of information systems at Cisco. In 
fiscal year 2000, 90% of Cisco’s $18.9 billion in sales came from online 
purchases, and 82% of customer inquiries were handled online.151 
Examination of Cisco’s financial statements in light of its extensive use of 
intangibles and ICT technology in its organizational and operational structure 
reveals one of the paradoxes of intangibles paradigm financial statements.  
Cisco’s virtual organization is clearly a core aspect of the operation of Cisco’s 
business both externally in relation to customers and internally with respect to 
company organization and operations.  The importance of Cisco’s virtual 
organization is also discussed widely in commentary about the company and at 
least mentioned in most discussions of the company’s business in financial and 
other publications, for example.152 
The place where extensive discussion of Cisco’s virtual organization is most 
 
145 See Shawn Tully, How Cisco Mastered the Net, FORTUNE (Aug. 17, 1998). 
146 Id. 
147 See CISCO 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (1998) (hereinafter, “CISCO 1997 ANNUAL REPORT”), at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/ac49/ac20/ac19/ac15/about_cisco_annual_report_links_launch
.html (noting that Cisco began developing the CCO in 1993). 
148 See Stephen F. Jablonsky, Cisco’s “Virtual” Finance Organization, 12 J. CORP. ACCOUNTING 
& FIN. 29, 30-31 (2001). 
149 See Kraemer & Dedrick, supra note 34, at 20. 
150 Id. at 22. 
151 Id. at 22. 
152 See supra notes 34, 138, 145 and 148 and accompanying text. 
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noticeably lacking is in Cisco financial statements and its disclosure in reports and 
SEC required filings in general.  As a result, the costs of this virtual organization 
are difficult to assess and evaluate from the perspective of such financial 
statements and disclosure.  This virtual organization is thus virtually unreflected 
as a separate entry on Cisco’s balance sheet, income statement or in the notes to 
Cisco’s financial statements because it is characterized by a high degree of 
intangible resources.153 The expenditures Cisco has made with respect to this 
virtual organization are likely contained within the General and Administrative 
expenses of the Cisco income statement during the years that expenditures have 
occurred in connection with the virtual organization.154 The exact nature and 
amount of expenditures in building this virtual organization remain remarkably 
unclear from the perspective of Cisco’s financial statements and other disclosure.  
The absence of disclosure about Cisco’s intangibles investments is of particular 
concern given the significance of the virtual organization for Cisco’s operations.  
As a result of this lack of disclosure, the actual operation of this virtual 
organization is not at all transparent.  In fact, more is disclosed concerning this 
critical aspect of Cisco’s operations in magazines and business articles on Cisco 
than is typically evident in Cisco’s financial statements or other disclosure.155 The 
role of the virtual organization at Cisco, including the CCO and CEC, is 
comparable to the role that factories played with industrial companies operating 
under tangibles paradigm business models.  As was characteristic of the factory 
 
153 Some of the costs of Cisco’s virtual organization may be reflected in the breakdown of net 
property and equipment on Cisco’s balance sheet.  For the fiscal year ended July 26, 2003, for 
example, the total amount of computer equipment and related software carried on Cisco’s balance 
sheet was approximately $1.15 billion out of total assets of $3.7 billion, as compared with $1.02 
billion and $4.10 billion for the prior fiscal year.  CISCO 2003 ANNUAL REPORT (2004), at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/about/ac49/ac20/ac19/ac15/about_cisco_annual_report_links_launch
.html. However, since Cisco has a history of making many acquisitions, some portion of the these 
assets on its balance sheet may be a result of its accounting for acquisition transactions.  The 
allocation if the purchase price in an acquisition is reflected, for example, in the discussion of the 
allocation of the purchase price of the January 1995 Cisco acquisition LightStream Corporation.  
See CISCO 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at 41.  The allocation of the $120 million 
LightStream purchase price was primarily for purchased research and development ($95.8 
million), plant and equipment ($1.8 million) and goodwill ($19.7 million).  Id. The remaining 
purchase reflected cash, accounts receivable and other current assets.  See infra notes 265 to 298 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the accounting treatment of intangibles. 
154 For example, the Management Discussion and Analysis portion of the Cisco 1997 Annual 
Report suggests that at least some expenses connected to the development of information systems 
are included in the General and Administrative Expenses portion of Cisco’s income statement, 
noting:“The dollar increase reflects increased personnel costs necessary to support the Company’s 
business infrastructure, including those associated with its new European Logistics Center, as well 
as the further development of its information systems.” CISCO 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
147, at 25 (emphasis added). 
155 See, e.g., supra notes 34 and 138 for articles discussing Cisco’s virtual organization. 
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that was at the center of many tangibles paradigm business operations, the virtual 
organizations involving information systems and other largely intangible and 
internally generated resources developed by companies under the intangibles 
paradigm are often critical to such companies’ business success as well as the 
scalability of their operations. 
The lack of disclosure concerning a fundamental aspect of Cisco’s operations is 
remarkable when contrasted with accounting treatment of core tangible assets.  
Existing financial statement reporting and SEC disclosure requirements reflect 
tangibles paradigm assumptions by requiring specific disclosures with regard to 
tangible assets.156 Comparable specific required disclosure does not exist with 
respect to intangible resources.  This means that existing frameworks do not 
adequately delineate what may need to be modified such that required disclosures 
may more fully and adequately represent economic reality under the intangibles 
paradigm.157 Identifying how intangibles are used will help illustrate their 
pervasive presence in business today and why the relative absence and lack of 
transparency of internally developed intangibles in the financial statements of 
companies such as Cisco may be problematic. 
B. Intangibles and Business Practice: The Uses of Intangible Resources 
1. The Role of Intangibles 
Intangibles play a growing role in American business and both the U.S. and 
global economies.158 Market services and intangible goods now account for more 
than two-thirds of U.S. GDP.159 Services increased from 22 percent of GDP in 
1950 to some 39 percent in 1999.160 Intangibles are primary drivers in the post-
industrial era and are increasingly important factors in wealth creation and 
economic growth.161 Intangibles are also increasingly viewed by businesses as 
critical to the enhancement of their competitive advantage and productivity.162 
156 Item 102 of Regulation S-K (“Description of Property”), for example, requires specific 
disclosures with respect to physical properties.  See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.102. 
157 See infra notes 390 to 422 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra notes 13 to 16 and accompanying text. 
159 See MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M.H. WALLMAN, UNSEEN WEALTH 7 (2001). 
160 Id. at 11.  See also Margaret M. Blair, Gary M. Hoffman & Salvatore P. Tamburo, Clarifying 
Intellectual Property Rights for the New Economy (2001), Georgetown University Law Center, 
Working Paper No. 274038, at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=274038; Croes, supra 
note 13. 
161 See DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 17 (noting that ideas and technology deriving from such 
ideas are primary long-term cause of economic growth, with information technology and the 
manufacture of physical goods relating to such information technology boosting growth rates of 
gross output by an estimated 1 percent per year); Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, 
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At the same time as intangibles are becoming more important, the relevance of 
financial statements is decreasing.163 When, as has been the case at companies 
such as Cisco and Microsoft, a balance sheet includes assets that reflect only 5 to 
10 percent of the market value of a company, reasonable questions may arise as to 
the usefulness of such balance sheets as a source of information.164 The 
effectiveness of balance sheets as measures of economic value is integrally 
connected to the gap between market values and book values of assets. 
2. The Market to Book Ratio:  A Reflection of Intangibles? 
In 1982, $62.30 of every $100 invested in stocks was spent on tangible assets, 
while in 1992, only $37.90 of every $100 was spent on such assets,165 a decrease 
of 39 percent during the course of the decade.  One indicator seen as a marker of 
the importance of intangibles as sources of business value for companies is the 
divergence between two measures of company value: the market value of public 
 
Market Economies and Rule of Law (Apr. 4, 2003), Financial Markets Conference of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island, Georgia (“Only in recent decades, as the economic product 
of the United States has become so predominantly conceptual, have issues related to the protection 
of intellectual property rights come to be seen as significant sources of legal and business 
uncertainty.”), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/speeches/2003/20030404/default.htm; 
Aboody & Lev, supra note 35, at 6-7 (noting that most corporate growth in last 20 to 30 years has 
been generated by intangible assets in developing economies); The European Commission, ICT 
Investment in the Intangible Economy §2.1, at http://www.ll-a.fr/eu-
epsilon/resources/ict/home.htm (noting that average ICT growth rate between 1987 and 1994 
almost twice that of world GDP growth rate).  
162 Lev, supra note 18, at 11-20; The European Commission, supra note 161, at §1 (noting that 
prime determinants of success today grounded in information and knowledge); Cañibano et al., 
supra note 41, at 5 (noting progressive movement in last two decades to knowledge-based 
technology intensive economy in which investments in intangibles are an essential part of 
competitive position and business viability and that efficient management of such knowledge is 
major source of competitive advantage); Clark Eustace, New Modes of Competitive Advantage for 
the Intangible Economy (Nov. 1999) (commenting that knowledge economy has led business 
community to rethink relationship between intangibles and corporate performance because 
intangibles are recognized as a prime source of competitive advantage, leading to strategic 
deployment of intangibles as key business assets), at 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/ecommerce/issues/intangibles/C_Eustace_full_pres.html; see also
JONATHAN LOW AND PAM COHEN KALAFUT, INVISIBLE ADVANTAGE: HOW INTANGIBLES ARE 
DRIVING BUSINESS PERFORMANCE (2002). 
163 See Eli Amir & Baruch Lev, Value-Relevance of Nonfinancial Information: The Wireless 
Communications Industry, 22 J. ACCOUNTING & ECON. 3 (1996) (noting a decline in value 
relevance of financial statements); Jennifer Francis & Katherine Schipper, Have Financial 
Statements Lost Their Relevance?, 37 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 319 (1999) (noting decline in 
explanatory power of earnings statements). 
164 See infra notes 168 to 188 and accompanying text. 
165 Daum, supra note 65, at 4. 
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companies as reflected in the companies’ stock prices and the book value of such 
companies’ assets on their balance sheets.166 This gap between market value and 
book value is at least partially associated with the value placed on companies’ 
intangibles by investors.167 
CHART 1 
 
Sources: Lev, infra note 169; Lev, infra note 170. 
 
166 Lev, supra note 18, at 31-33; PATRICK H. SULLIVAN, Introduction to Intellectual Capital 
Management, in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM 
INNOVATION 4 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); THOMAS A. STEWART, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
295-296 (1998) (stating that gap actually measures the intensity of knowledge assets rather than 
the relative amounts of intangibles versus tangible assets and is thus not an accurate measure of 
intangibles because market values rise and fall with exuberance and book value is based on 
historical cost while market value includes market valuation of future earnings). 
167 See Sullivan, supra note 166, at 4; Lev, supra note 2, at 132 (noting that this gap also reflects 
the difference between current and historical cost values of physical assets); J.B. Backhuijs, 
W.G.M. Holterman, R.S. Oudman, R.P.M. Overgoor & S.M. Zijlstra, Reporting on Intangible 
Assets 6, Final Report for the Benefit of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and Intangible 
Assets Pilot Project Sounding Board Group (June 9-10, 1999), at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/43/1947807.pdf. 
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The trend during the intangibles era has been toward an increasing market to book 
gap.  As is evident in Chart 1 above, the ratio of market to book value, which 
reflects this gap, progressively increased for Standard & Poors 500 (S&P 500) 
companies from level of 0.81 in 1973 to 1.69 in 1992,168 which means that in 
1973 the book value of assets recorded on balance sheets was actually greater 
than the stock market values of these companies, constituting more than 120 
percent of market value.  By 1992, however, some 40 percent of total market 
value of S&P 500 companies was not reflected in assets on their balance sheets.169 
This ratio was 6.25 in 1999,170 suggesting that six of every seven dollars of 
corporate market value was derived from knowledge assets,171 and reached its 
peak of 7.5 in March 2000.172 Following market adjustments in 2000 and 2001, 
the ratio was still 4.2 in August 2002,173 suggesting that over three-quarters of the 
total market value of S&P 500 companies was not reflected in assets on their 
balance sheets.  Movement of the market to book value ratio reflects the fact that 
intangibles are a significant and quite volatile aspect of corporate value today,174 
and signals a fundamental shift in corporate and societal asset bases.175 Despite 
the volatility of this measure and influence of at times exuberant broader market 
movements, the numbers indicate a fundamental change in aggregate S&P 500 
balance sheets since 1972.  The magnitude of market to book gap is also reflected 
in company specific numbers for both ICT and non-ICT companies.176 The 
 
168 Prior to 1975, U.S. companies were permitted to capitalize research and development expenses.  
See Aswath Damodaran, Research and Development Expenses:  Implications for Profitability 
Measurement and Valuation 3 (1999), Stern School of Business Working Paper, at 
www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pdfiles/papers/R&D.pdf. 
169 Baruch Lev, Remarks on the Measurement, Valuation and Reporting of Intangible Assets,
FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV. 17 (Sept. 17, 2003). 
170 S&P 500 companies account for 75 percent of the total assets in the U.S. economy.  Baruch 
Lev, Knowledge and Shareholder Value 2, (Jan. 2000), at 
www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/knowledge&shareholdervalue.doc. 
171 Id.
172 Lev, supra note 169, at 17. The 2000 numbers also reflect public equity markets at their highest 
value in recent years. 
173 Id.
174 Id. 
175 The European Commission, supra note 161, at §1 (discussing shift in the asset base of 
companies and societies). 
176 In early 1999, for example, the equity of Proctor & Gamble (P&G) had a market value of over 
$121.7 billion.  The amount of equity recorded on P&G’s balance sheet was $12.2 billion.  Smith 
& Parr, supra note 40, at 89. Since equity reflects a company’s net assets (or assets minus 
liabilities), this suggests a significant gap between financial statement value and market valuations 
of P&G.  The P&G numbers highlight the significance of intangibles in companies outside the 
ICT sector.   
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magnitude of the gap between market and book value is, not surprisingly, 
typically greater for ICT companies.177 
In late 2000, even after a major market correction earlier in the year, stock prices 
would have needed to decrease by two-thirds for the gap between market and 
book value to disappear.178 This gap reflects the fact that intangibles are now a 
major source of value for many companies in both the ICT and non-ICT sectors, 
which gives evidence of the pervasiveness of intangibles for businesses today.  In 
addition, intangibles in recent years have accounted for more than 70 percent of 
the total market value of companies in a wide range of industries, including 
consumer goods, ICT, pharmaceuticals and entertainment at different times under 
varied stock market conditions and valuations.179 Other measures may also be 
used demonstrate the significance of intangibles under the intangibles 
paradigm.180 
177 In June 2000, after a significant correction in the value of technology stocks earlier that year, 
Microsoft’s net physical and financial assets were still less than 10 percent of its market value, and 
Cisco’s physical and financial assets constituted 5 percent of its market value. Lev, supra note 18, 
at 31. In early August 2000, The Walt Disney Company had a market capitalization of $117 
billion, but only $43.7 billion in balance sheet assets (including $11.3 billion in recognized 
intangible assets carried on Disney’s balance sheet), giving it some $85 billion in value 
attributable to intangibles. Blair & Wallman, supra note 158, at 12. For Sprint Corp., the gap in 
August 2000 was close to $31 billion, with a market capitalization of $60.2 billion and financial 
statement assets of $39 billion (including $9.6 billion in recognized intangibles).  Id. Net assets of 
SAP, the German enterprise resource planning and e-business software company, were only 4.6 
percent of SAP’s market value as of December 31, 1999. Daum, supra note 65, at 5. 
178 Blair & Wallman, supra note 158, at 12. 
179 Intangibles are the predominant source of value for a wide range of companies.  The 
percentages below represent the percent of total company stock market value attributable to 
intangibles based on the company’s market value as of the stated date:  The Walt Disney Company 
(70.9%, September 1998), H.J. Heinz Company (89.6%, April 1998), Johnson & Johnson (87.9%, 
December 1998), Merck & Company (93.5%, September 1998), Microsoft Corporation (97.8%, 
June 1998), Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M) (71.8%, December 1998), Philip Morris 
Companies (78.8%, December 1998), Nike, Inc. (76.0%, May 1998), Proctor & Gamble Company 
(88.5%, September 1997), Yahoo! Inc. (98.9%, December 1998).  See Smith & Parr, supra note 
40, at 123-149.  Similarly, in 1986, Merck’s book value was 12.3 percent of its market value, 
while in 1996, Coca-Cola’s book assets were 5 percent of its market value and Microsoft’s just 6 
percent.  In 2001, Cisco’s book value was 25 percent of its market value, while GE’s book assets 
were 10 percent of its market value.  See Jeremy Galbreath, Twenty-First Century Management 
Rules:  The Management of Relationships as Intangible Assets, 40 MGMT DESIGN 116, 117 (2002). 
180 Tobin’s q is one such measure.  Tobin’s q, developed by Nobel prize winning economist James 
Tobin, is the ratio of the stock market value of a firm to the replacement value of the firm’s capital 
assets.  As such, it indirectly measures the rate of return of an asset. See Erik Brynjolfsson & Lorin 
M. Hitt, Beyond Computation: Information Technology, Organizational Transformation and 
Business Performance, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 34 (2000); see also Steven R. Bond & Jason G. 
Cummins, The Stock Market and Investment in the New Economy: Some Tangible Facts and 
Intangible Fictions, in INTANGIBLE ASSETS 95, 96 (John R.M. Hand & Baruch Lev eds., 2003).  
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Underlying the book to market gap is the operation of the intangibles paradigm.  
Although the market to book ratio suggests that intangibles may be undervalued 
by markets, the picture is actually a bit more complex.  The market to book gap 
reflects a persistent failure under the intangibles paradigm for financial reporting 
and other corporate disclosures to represent adequately and consistently the 
economic reality of business operations under the intangibles paradigm.  In some 
instances, investments in intangibles by some companies may be undervalued, but 
in others companies may be overvalued.181 Market trends may further obscure 
individual company valuations as well.  The bull market at the end of the 1990s 
may, for example, have been associated with markets overvaluing intangibles, 
which is likely reflected in the 7.5 market to book ratio number in March 2000.  
The fact that the market may have overvalued intangibles in aggregate during the 
height of the bubble does not, however, obscure the operation of the intangibles 
paradigm or the fact that markets may in the case of individual companies either 
undervalue or overvalue the contribution of intangibles.   
The market to book gap does, however, suggest that existing disclosure standards 
for intangibles are not adequate and too often result in distorted and inaccurate 
company financial statements and disclosures that do not match economic 
reality.182 This ultimately means that markets and investors may not always have 
information that would enable them to value the contribution of intangibles to 
companies consistently across different companies.  Since one goal of financial 
statements is to provide for the fair presentation of financial data that can be also 
compared between firms and industries,183 the development of disclosure 
mechanisms on the financial reporting and securities regulation fronts are 
important avenues for dealing with the operation of the intangibles paradigm.184 
As a result of this paradigm shift, financial statements have become less 
informative from an accounting and economic perspective.185 One example of 
this is the diminishing extent to which balance sheets describe the sources from 
which companies derive value. If balance sheets reflected the entire value 
attributed to company by financial markets, the book value of assets should not 
diverge significantly from the company’s stock market value. In a strongly 
 
181 See infra notes 404 to 421 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 265 to 316 and accompanying text. 
183 See Shorter, supra note 46, at 2 (“GAAP are guidelines and rules for use by accountants in 
preparing financial statements, that have evolved over years, and are designed to help ensure that 
financial data are presented fairly and are comparable from firm to firm and from industry to 
industry”).  
184 See infra notes 390 to 421 to and accompanying text. 
185 Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 5; Lev, supra note 18, at 99-101; Lev & Zarowin, supra note 
121. 
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efficient stock market, the market value of a company always equals its 
fundamental value.186 Although, stock markets are not strongly efficient, the 
extent to which the market value of a company equals its fundamental economic 
value may be an indicator of the manner in which the market responds to 
information concerning a company as well as the extent to which fundamental 
economic reality is reflected or not reflected in resulting market valuations, all of 
which are closely tied to company representations, accounting presentations and 
disclosure. The reasons for the increasing divergence between market values and 
book values are rooted in the fact that accounting treatment for intangible and 
tangible assets is significantly different.187 The economic uncertainty associated 
with intangibles is also typically greater than for physical assets.188 The economic 
uncertainty of intangibles is magnified by the influence of company presentations 
of financial results, particularly in the current business milieu in which intangibles 
are increasingly predominant.  Such presentations take on added significance 
given the potentially significant flexibility that companies may have to present 
their economic reality.  This is particularly true since existing regulatory 
structures have not fully adapted to the economic reality of the knowledge 
economy. 
C. Presentation and Performance: Company Framing Choices and Audience 
Impressions 
1.  Dramaturgical Aspects of Company Presentations 
How businesses present themselves in different contexts is an important aspect of 
business behavior and practice.  Business presentations are in fact often heavily 
context dependent.  In fact, presentation opportunities represent points at which a 
company may demonstrate performance variations in its choice of the type, nature 
and content of its discourse and disclosure.  Performance in the business context 
is reflected in the activity of individual representatives who speak on behalf of a 
business, as well as documents issued on behalf of or with respect to the 
company.   Such performances may be seen as encompassing specific contexts of 
activity on behalf of or with respect to a company that occur “during a period 
marked by . . . continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which 
has some influence on the observers.”189 
186 Bond & Cummins, supra note 180, at 96.  
187 See infra notes 268 to 298 and accompanying text; Lev, supra note 18, at 79-103. 
188 See Lev, supra note 18, at 41-42, 82; Feng Gu & Baruch Lev, Intangible Assets: Measurement, 
Drivers, Usefulness 2-3, Working Paper #2003-05, Boston University School of Management, at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/intangible-assets.doc.  
189 See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF THE SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 22 (1959). 
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The individuals who comprise management are typically the principal actors 
involved in such performances, reflecting the established social roles that are 
expected in the business context. Such established social roles would include, 
among others, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chairman of the Board of 
Directors, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Operating Officer (COO) and 
other management positions.  These roles are certainly not identical from 
company to company and individuals in these roles do have some ability to define 
their roles in the course of performance.  Despite this, general societal and 
business expectations do typically exist as to the nature of these roles and their 
responsibilities.  In addition, individuals in these roles may have a variety of 
“fronts” from which to choose.190 
Such performance choices exist on a different plane than is typically envisaged in 
discussions about compliance with securities disclosure requirements or 
accounting rules.  At one end of the spectrum, however, when such performances 
constitute fraud or a material misrepresentation, they implicate potentially serious 
legal and accounting compliance concerns.  However, within this spectrum, as a 
result of the available range of choices, potentially many modes of presentation 
exist that a company might use to represent economic reality within the context of 
existing accounting and legal disclosure requirements.191 How and in what 
manner a company frames itself within such rules and regulations is thus 
important and potentially flexible depending on the context of presentation.  Such 
framing is most evident in the choices companies make about how to present 
themselves both internally and externally. 
The individuals in the management of a start-up company seeking venture capital 
financing, for example, may use different discourse when speaking with 
prospective venture capital investors than they might use with regard to existing 
investors or even potential strategic partners. This discourse may reflect the 
selection of a “front” or the “part of the individual’s performance which regularly 
functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who 
observe the performance.”192 This reflects the fact that businesses often target 
such presentations or performances to suit the nature and expectations of the 
anticipated audience.  As such, business presentations have dramaturgical 
 
190 Id.; see also infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
191 Cf. RICHARD BAUMAN, A WORLD OF OTHERS’ WORDS: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERTEXTUALITY 124 (2004) (“[F]or the productiveness of considering performance not as any 
doing of an oral literary text, but as one of the range of interactionally defined presentation modes, 
or frames, which may be more or less functionally dominant in any act of spoken communication 
or at any given point during its course.”). 
192 Goffman, supra note 189, at 22. 
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elements.  Moreover, such presentations are ones in which “the individual infuses 
his activity with signs which dramatically heighten and portray confirmatory facts 
that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure.  For if the individual’s 
activity is to become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it 
will express during the interaction what he wishes to convey.”193 For example, in 
the case of a representative of a business giving a presentation, the business 
person, by operating in a certain manner or mode, seeks to create a particular 
impression on the part of the audience.194 The creation of such impressions is an 
important aspect of the process by which corporations communicate in 
interpretable ways with various audiences in varied contexts.195 
The impression that the person making the presentation seeks to evoke may have 
a significant influence on how the presentation is received by the audience.  By 
initiating a presentation seeking a particular impression, the presenter thus 
“implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered 
before them.”196 Face-to-face meetings and other contexts in which companies 
make presentations suggest that contextually determined self-presentation is an 
important factor in how businesses create a particular impression of the company 
and its operations.  Such business presentations highlight the fact that businesses 
choose elements for a particular characterization of the company in a particular 
context from a potentially wide range of choices.  The dramaturgical aspects of 
company presentations thus suggest that companies have some ability to define 
the context within which they represent a particular economic reality.  Such 
framing may have a potentially significant impact on how a particular 
representation of reality is both received and accepted. 
2. Variations in Performance:  The Implications of Presentation 
Choices 
Company presentations may exhibit significant variations in both the style and 
content of performance in different contexts.  Companies may, for instance, have 
characteristic internal presentations to employees or senior managers, for 
example, which may differ from external presentations, as well as varying 
presentations among different internal constituencies.  The documentary film 
 
193 Id. at 30. 
194 Id. at [17]. 
195 See Bauman, supra note 191, at 123 (noting that performance rests on two dimensions of 
communicative competence: “knowledge and the ability to communicate in socially appropriate 
and interpretable ways”). 
196 Goffman, supra note 189, at 17. 
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Startup.com,197 for example, illustrates this point clearly.  This film contrasts 
internal presentations to employees by the Chief Executive Officer of 
GovWorks.com, the Internet startup depicted in the film, with meetings with 
external audiences, particularly venture capital firms.  It also illustrates some 
potential differences in presentation between internal company-wide meetings and 
internal meetings of senior managers. 
It is thus quite typical for senior management and those empowered to speak on 
behalf of companies to present entirely different portraits of the company for 
varied purposes and in different contexts.198 Such variances in presentations do 
not necessarily involve deception but may merely involve selective emphasis of 
relevant factors relating to a particular economic or business reality targeted to a 
particular audience or forum.  In addition to face-to-face meetings, businesses 
also engage in such presentations to varied audiences through the medium of 
business documents such as annual reports, required SEC disclosure and by 
means of financial statements.  Businesses also engage in presentations in other 
contexts such as web casts, newspaper and television coverage and analyst calls, 
for example.  
One potential limitation on a company’s ability to engage in differential 
presentations for different audiences is legal requirements regarding company 
disclosures imposed by the SEC.  Disclosures, particularly for companies subject 
to SEC periodic reporting requirements, could potentially subject a company to 
liability under securities laws that incorporate GAAP accounting standards that 
govern how particular transactions may be measured and reported.199 The recent 
SEC Regulation FD is an explicit recognition of the fact that businesses may 
make different presentations and may disclose different information to different 
audiences.  Regulation FD, which became effective in October 2000, addresses 
 
197 See STARTUP.COM (Artisan Entertainment 2001). 
198 Different books for book and tax purposes are one example of this phenomenon.  See e.g., 
Luppino, supra note 100 (discussing divergent tax and accounting treatment of synthetic leases); 
see also supra notes 100 to 111 and accompanying text. 
199 The Exchange Act, for example, imposes periodic reporting requirements on companies with 
securities registered under the Exchange Act (e.g., Reports on Form 10-K and Reports on Form 
10-Q). 15 U.S.C. §78m (2003).  The Exchange Act and rules promulgated under the Exchange Act 
also contain anti-fraud provisions that govern disclosures made by all companies in the course of 
selling securities.  See Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005) (imposing securities law 
liabilities for any untrue statement or omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading). 
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selective disclosure by companies to analysts.200 Regulation FD provides that 
companies disclosing material nonpublic information to securities market 
professionals (e.g., analysts) must also make public disclosure of such 
information.201 Regulation FD was proposed by the SEC as a result of a concern 
about selective disclosure of certain information to institutional investors and 
analysts before such information was disclosed to the general public.202 
Rules governing disclosures do not, however, fully address the phenomenon of 
contextual framing that may create a particular impression within which company 
representations of economic reality may be received and accepted.  As a result, 
although guidelines primarily in the form of SEC rules and regulations such as 
Regulation FD exist with respect to disclosure in general, companies have 
flexibility particularly in face-to-face presentations as well as in written 
documents.  Business documents, for example, are not all identical and different 
companies clearly have different styles of presentation.   
The styles of presentation for a particular company may change over time as a 
reflection of changing business strategy, changing external conditions or other 
factors.  It is not at all uncommon, for example, for a new CEO coming to a 
company to make changes in business strategy from prior management.203 The 
recent selection of a new CEO at Delta underscores how this process may occur.  
The new CEO of Delta has presented himself as a change in direction from prior 
management, despite the fact that he served as a member of the Delta board of 
directors for 17 years.204 Such strategic changes are often underscored by how 
new management chooses to present the company and its business strategy in 
face-to-face and other contexts of performance.  This presentation process 
essentially entails framing the company within the broader business context. 
 
200 Regulation FD, 17 CFR §243.100-243.103 (2005); Final Rule—“Selective Disclosure and 
Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, 2000 SEC LEXIS ___ (Oct. 23, 2000) 
[hereinafter “Regulation FD Release”]. 
201 Regulation FD Release, supra note 200, at ___. 
202 Id. at ___. 
203 See infra notes 230 to 235 and accompanying text for a discussion of changing business 
strategy at IBM. 
204 See Evan Perez, With Delta Reeling, Chief Plans Unusual Bet on Premium Routes, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 16, 2004), at A1, A6 (noting that new Delta CEO “in talks with the rank and file . . . has 
criticized prior management’s mistakes and presented himself as a sharp departure, despite having 
been a Delta director for the past 17 years,” and commenting that “[p]erhaps Mr. Grinstein’s most 
remarkable achievement has been to convince many employees that he represents a clear departure 
from prior management – no small feat given his many years as a powerful board member.”). 
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The shift to the intangibles paradigm reveals at times sharp delineation in the 
content of company self-presentations as companies seek to characterize 
economic reality and their business strategies as incorporating intangibles and 
existing within what might be termed intangibles paradigm discourse.  The 
primary audience for such presentations is financial markets and market 
participants such as investment managers, investment bankers, analysts and 
others.  The Internet bubble in the stock market in the late 1990s also resulted in a 
great deal of media attention being directed toward companies, both technology 
start-up and other companies.205 
The proliferation of media coverage and advertising concerning the economy, 
stock market, business and specific companies indicates a broadening of the 
potential audiences to which businesses might direct their presentations.206 
Expanding stock ownership has also increased the size of the potential audience 
for such presentations.207 This expansion in both financial media coverage and 
the audience receiving such news was particularly evident during the Internet 
bubble when technology analysts such as Mary Meeker and Henry Blodgett 
received extensive media attention.208 Significant media attention was also 
directed toward companies themselves, including startups, many of which had no 
track record and limited operations.  In the film Startup.com, for example, the 
 
205 See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Internet and the Investor, 15 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 41, Winter 2001; Angel Arrese & Mercedes Medina, Competition Between New 
and Old Media in Economic and Financial News Markets 6, Working Paper, University of 
Navarra, Pamplona, Spain, available at 
http://scholar.google.com/url?sa=U&q=http://www.tukkk.fi/mediagroup/5WMEC%2520PAPERS
/Arrese%2520%26%2520Medina.pdf  (analyzing the changing competitive environment of the 
economic and financial news sector  and noting the renewed preeminence of economic, business 
and financial information since the 1990s). 
206 M. Emmison, The Economy: Its Emergence in Media Discourse, in LANGUAGE, IMAGE AND 
MEDIA (H. Davis & P. Walton eds. 1983); Richard Parker, The Revolution in America’s Financial 
Industry: How Well Is the Press Covering the Story? 5, Money, Markets and the News: 
Monograph 3, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (discussing the framing and presentation of 
news about the financial services industry), available at 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/shorenstein/Research_Publications/Reports/Parkerpaperfinal.PDF. 
207 Bill Saporito, The Business Century: How the Economy Became Hot News in the Last 100 
Years, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Mar./Apr. 1999), at 48-51 (discussing how expanding stock 
ownership increased the demand for financial reporting and financial information), available at 
http://archives.cjr.org/year/99/2/business.asp. 
208 John Schwartz, Enron’s Collapse: The Analyst, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at C8; Landon 
Thomas, Jr., As Technology Stock Climb, It Starts to Feel Like the 90’s All Over Again, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at C1. 
Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy 45 
 Draft of 9:27 AM, 3/11/06 
 Do Not Cite or Distribute 
Copyright 2006 
CEO of the company made multiple media appearances, which presented 
additional opportunities for framing the company.209 
As a result of the proliferation of business and financial media coverage through 
traditional old media sources and new avenues such as the Internet, the audience 
that businesses might reach through such presentations is increasingly expanding 
to include a broader segment of the general public.210 This broadening media 
attention provides additional opportunities for framing and further reinforces the 
multicontextual aspects of business presentations and framing that reproduce 
certain aspects of business worldview and practice that have emerged or 
intensified under the intangibles paradigm.  
D. A New Business Paradigm: Business Worldview and Practice under the 
Intangibles Paradigm 
1. The Intangibles Paradigm Shift 
a. Paradigm Shifts from a Kuhnian Perspective 
The intangibles paradigm shift is a profoundly important reorientation reflective 
of the post-industrial context within which businesses operate.211 This 
fundamental paradigm shift involves business practice and worldview.212 Thomas 
 
209 See Startup.com, supra note 197. 
210 Arrese & Medina, supra note 205, at 6-12 (noting that trends in the media world led to new 
stardom for economic and financial news in broadcasting and electronic media, evident, for 
example, in the emergence of channels specialized in economic and financial news such as FNN, 
CNBC, CNNfn, Bloomberg Information Television and European Business News and websites 
devoted to economic and financial issues); Andy Serwer, I Want My CNBC, FORTUNE (May 24, 
1999), at 139-141; Richard Tomlinson, There’s an All-Out War to Report on Our Financial Times,
FORTUNE (Nov. 27, 2000) (discussing the Financial Times expansion to the U.S. market and the 
expansion of financial media coverage), at 72; Internet Sapping Broadcast News Audience, The 
Pew Research Center For The People & The Press, Jun. 11, 2000 (noting that the rapid emergence 
of the Internet as a news source that is attracting key segments of the national audience), available 
at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=36; Enrique Dans, Internet Newspapers. 
Are Some More Equal Than Others?, 2 INT’L J. OF MEDIA MGMT 4, 4 (2000) (discussing the 
expansion of news available on the Internet and the consumer response to Internet news), 
available at http://www.mediajournal.org/modules/pub/download.php?id=mediajournal-
69&user=&pass=; WAYNE PARSONS, THE POWER OF THE FINANCIAL PRESS: JOURNALISM AND 
ECONOMIC OPINION IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA (Rutgers 1990). 
211 See Paul A. David, The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern 
Productivity Paradox, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 355, 356 (1990) (commenting on emergence of a new 
“techno-economic regime based on computer and communications innovation” that is 
“supplanting the mature, ossified Fordist regime of mass production.”). 
212 Paul B. Westberg & Patrick H. Sullivan, In Search of a Paradigm in PROFITING FROM 
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 59, 59-75 (Patrick H. Sullivan 
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Kuhn’s model of normal science and the scientific revolutions associated with 
paradigm shifts in the sciences can be used to illuminate the processes that have 
characterized the shift to an intangibles paradigm in business.213 From Kuhn’s 
perspective, the history of science can be described as a process of destructive-
constructive paradigm changes involving periods of normal science characterized 
by widespread acceptance of a certain paradigm or accepted model or pattern.214 
Such paradigms, however, typically do not account for all aspects of the 
observable phenomena that they seek to explain, giving rise to what Kuhn calls 
“anomalies.”215 In such anomalies are the seeds of the crises leading to scientific 
revolutions that Kuhn sees as typifying the shift to new paradigms.  Kuhn 
theorizes that certain scientists, typically those who are either younger or new to a 
given field and thus less permeated with ideas linked with current paradigms,216 
are associated with initiating paradigm shifts through their examination of and 
attempts to explain anomalies in existing paradigms.  Because existing paradigms 
do not explain such anomalous characteristics, new paradigms develop to 
explicate what could not be explained under the old paradigm.217 Such new 
paradigms also contain within them the anomalous characteristics that may be the 
basis for future paradigm shifts. 
b. The Metaphysical and Sociological Aspects of the 
Intangibles Paradigm 
In contrast to paradigm shifts in the scientific community, which are precipitated 
by changing perceptions of external conditions, the shift to an intangibles 
paradigm in the business context is probably best seen as precipitated by changes 
in external conditions and underlying economic reality, particularly the 
 
ed., 1998) (discussing generally the Kuhnian paradigm concept in relation to knowledge 
companies); The European Commission, supra note 161, at §1 (discussing structural shift in mode 
of corporate wealth creation to knowledge based model whose defining trend is shift from tangible 
to intangible factors of production, which has led to a shift in the asset base of companies and 
societies). 
213 See Kuhn, supra note 17; see also Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics in CRITICISM 
AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 231, 266-277 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970) 
(discussing the multiple meanings of paradigm in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions).  
214 Kuhn, supra note 17, at 23, 66, 96 (describing normal research as a cumulative process). 
215 Kuhn notes, for example, that a paradigm is a theory that is better than its competitors, but that 
not necessarily and “in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted.” Id. 
at 17-18.  An anomaly “opens a period in which conceptual categories are adjusted until the 
initially anomalous has become the anticipated.”  Id. at 64. 
216 Id. at 90. (noting that “[a]lmost always the men who achieve these fundamental inventions of a 
new paradigm have been either very young or very new to the field whose paradigm they 
change”). 
217 Id. at 92. 
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competitive environment in which businesses operate and the changes associated 
with globalization, deregulation and increased competition.218 Although Kuhn 
uses the term paradigm in many different senses in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, his uses of paradigm as metaphysical and sociological constructions 
are most relevant to consideration of the intangibles paradigm in business.219 The 
term paradigm as used herein, does not in any way imply an acceptance of the 
entirety of Kuhn’s model of the development of normal science in a business 
context.  However, at the core of the intangibles paradigm is a fundamental 
change in the nature of and perceptions of the milieu in which businesses operate 
in the post-industrial era knowledge economy.  These changing perceptions have 
been closely associated with changing external conditions, and involve both 
metaphysical aspects relating to worldview and sociological aspects evident in 
changing business practice.  Such changes have been accompanied by 
transformations in discussions about business organization and practice.  One 
example of this are changes in the actual language companies use to describe their 
incorporation of intangibles as well as company framing and descriptions of 
changes in business practices associated with the intangibles paradigm shift. 
The metaphysical aspects of the shift to an intangibles paradigm are illustrated by 
changing worldviews concerning the sources from which businesses derive their 
primary value.220 One important reflection of the development of the intangibles 
paradigm worldview is the proliferating strategic intellectual property business 
literature that has developed under the intangibles paradigm.  This literature 
includes a myriad of books and articles that discuss the importance of intangibles 
for business from a strategic and value creation perspective.221 This literature 
 
218 Lev, supra note 18, at 8-13 (noting that globalization, deregulation and increased competition 
are factors in the increasing predominance of intangibles). 
219 Margaret Masterman and George Ritzer, in particular, have discussed Kuhn’s uses of the term 
paradigm and classified his uses into broad categories, the most significant of which are the 
metaphysical and sociological aspects of a paradigm. The terms metaphysical and sociological 
paradigm come from Margaret Masterman’s comprehensive and thorough discussion of the nature 
and uses of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm concept.  See Margaret Masterman, The Nature of a 
Paradigm in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 59, 65 (Imre Lakatos & Alan 
Musgrave eds., 1970) (distinguishing between metaphysical paradigms, sociological paradigms 
and construct paradigms); see also GEORGE RITZER, SOCIOLOGY: A MULTIPLE PARADIGM 
SCIENCE 4-6 (rev. ed. 1980) (subsuming three types of paradigm identified by Masterman under 
rubric of metaphysical paradigm). 
220 The market to book gap, for example, gives evidence of the fundamental changes in sources of 
value for businesses.  See supra notes 165 to 188 and accompanying text. 
221 The core works in this body of works were originally published in the 1980s and 1990s. See, 
e.g., Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual Property, HARV.
BUS. REV. 8 (Jan.-Feb. 2000); JULIE L. DAVIS & SUZANNE S. HARRISON, EDISON IN THE 
BOARDROOM (2001); KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC:
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reflects the strategic importance of intangible assets to businesses and is likely a 
factor in and illustrative of the increasing recognition of the significance of 
intangibles and value attributed to intangibles by markets and firms. This 
literature thus plays a role comparable to that attributed to textbooks, lectures and 
laboratory exercises by Kuhn in tending to reveal the nature and contents of 
underlying paradigms.222 
This increasing recognition about the economic reality of intangibles for 
businesses reflects the extent to which the shift to an intangibles paradigm 
represents a change in worldview or “new way of seeing.”223 This new 
worldview is partly driven by the fact that intangibles are fundamentally different 
from tangible assets, particularly in relation to boundaries.  In the tangible asset 
context, boundaries are easier to draw because the tangibility of a product with a 
physical embodiment makes establishment and reinforcement of boundaries 
around the product more clear-cut.224 
The sociological and metaphysical aspects of the intangibles paradigm shift are 
clearly interrelated.  It is, however, useful to separate them conceptually, which 
can contribute to understanding the dynamic processes by which the shift to an 
 
UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS (2000); Suzanne Harrison & Kevin Rivette, The IP 
Portfolio as a Competitive Tool in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE 
FROM INNOVATION 119-128 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Patrick H. Sullivan, Extracting Value 
from Intellectual Property in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE 
FROM INNOVATION 103-118 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Patrick H. Sullivan, Extracting Value 
from Intellectual Assets in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE FROM 
INNOVATION 173-185 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Gordon Petrash, Intellectual Asset 
Management at Dow Chemical in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL: EXTRACTING VALUE 
FROM INNOVATION 205-220 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Lori Morrison & Paul Germeraad, 
Intellectual Asset Management at Avery Dennison in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL:
EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 221-241 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Kari Laento, 
Intellectual Asset Management at Nestle in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL:
EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 242-252 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); Leif Edvinsson, 
Managing Intellectual Capital at Skandia in PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL:
EXTRACTING VALUE FROM INNOVATION 279-283 (Patrick H. Sullivan ed., 1998); ROBERT S. 
KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, STRATEGY MAPS: CONVERTING INTANGIBLE ASSETS INTO 
TANGIBLE OUTCOMES (2004).  In these pieces, varied terminology is used to describe intangible 
assets in the accounting and business literature.  Terms used include intellectual capital, 
knowledge assets and human capital. See Lev, supra note 18, at 5 (discussing terminology); 
Sullivan, supra note 166 (discussing terminology), at 5; Westberg & Sullivan, supra note 212, at 
63  (giving timeline of events in the intellectual capital business strategy movement). 
222 See Kuhn, supra note 17, at 43.   
223 Kuhn, supra note 17, at 117-121 (noting that textbooks, lectures and laboratory exercises reveal 
the nature and contents of underlying paradigms); see also Masterman, supra note 213, at 76-79; 
Ritzer, supra note 213, at 4-10. 
224 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29 for a discussion of intangibles and boundaries. 
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intangibles paradigm has occurred.  Particularly relevant here is how worldview 
changes have translated sociologically into changes in the behavior of individuals 
and firms.  Under the intangibles paradigm, a fundamental change in sociological 
orientation has also occurred with respect to how many companies operate on a 
day-to-day basis.225 The organizational practices evident in Cisco’s CCO, CEC 
and VFO reflect these changes.226 On a sociological level, the intangibles 
paradigm shift is most evident in the changes in organizational structure and 
practices of businesses associated with the intangibles era.227 Although the 
intangibles paradigm is broader and includes changes other than those connected 
to the ICT economy, many of these sociological changes involve the 
incorporation of intangibles, including ICTs, into companies and insertion of 
companies in the context of the ICT economy.  Cisco and Wal-Mart are examples 
of companies who have successfully done this and who are at the forefront of 
incorporating intangibles and ICTs into their business organization and 
practices.228 
c. Business Representations, Corporate Documents and the 
Intangibles Paradigm 
Both metaphysical and sociological components of the intangibles paradigm shift 
are evident in the framing in corporate documents such as annual reports that 
position companies and describe corporate strategies and actions taken.  A marked 
shift began at the end of the twentieth century in how companies describe 
themselves in terms of the conceptualization and utilization of intangible 
resources and other factors associated with the intangibles paradigm. 
Corporate annual reports are useful documents for assessing the impact of the 
intangibles paradigm on business worldview and practice.  They also provide 
evidence for the penetration of intangibles paradigm discourse in the business 
context by framing and positioning companies in two ways.  Companies position 
themselves within the intangibles paradigm and discuss the role and integration of 
intangibles and ICTs within in companies. The proliferation of ecommerce and 
 
225 See e.g., Daum, supra note 65.  In Kuhn’s usage, these sociological changes would be 
analogous to a concrete set of habits or an accepted judicial precedent. Kuhn, supra note 17, at 10, 
23 (“. . .like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation 
and specification under new or more stringent conditions.”); see also Ritzer, supra note 219, at 4-
6. 
226 See supra notes 138 to 156 and accompanying text. 
227 See Kuhn, supra note 17, at 18 (recognizing that the emergence of a new paradigm affects 
organizational structures). 
228 See infra notes 384 to 395 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wal-Mart and supra 
notes 138 to 155 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cisco. 
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Internet terminology in company documents such as annual reports in the late 
1990s illustrates this point.  My review of company annual reports showed that 
prior to the collapse of the Internet bubble, a broad range of companies used 
language in annual reports and other disclosure documents derived from and 
related to the experience of ICT, ecommerce and Internet companies.  Following 
the collapse of the Internet bubble, Internet-related terminology decreased, 
although general references to ICTs remained evident.  Corporate annual reports 
and other documents generated by companies are also instructive in that they 
reflect a company’s presentation of itself to public markets and investors.229 
IBM is an example of a company that used changing discourse and framing to 
highlight and sell a new business strategy to markets that were skeptical about its 
future.  Despite its extensive patent portfolio and status as a leading technology 
company, in 1993, on the arrival of a new CEO, Louis Gerstner, IBM had 
declining revenues, earnings and stock price,230 reflecting the fact that it was 
viewed as being inbred and ingrown.231 IBM was able to reverse course and 
successfully implement new technology strategies.232 As part of this process, 
IBM embedded itself within intangibles paradigm discourse.  The 1994 IBM 
Annual Report is particularly notable because it describes 1994 as the year that 
the new IBM emerged.233 In its 1994 Annual Report, IBM focuses on 
information technology, noting that information technology would revolutionize 
society.234 The 1994 IBM Annual Report emphasizes placing IBM within the 
context of what IBM terms the technology revolution.235 IBM’s use of language 
in the 1994 Annual Report typifies intangibles paradigm discourse. 
Non-ICT intensive companies also evidence an intangibles discourse that 
emphasizes the importance of intangibles and ICTs in general and the specific 
applications of such technologies in specific business contexts.  Wal-Mart reflects 
this phenomenon. After virtually no mention of intangibles, ICTs or related terms 
in Annual Reports since 1970, in the mid-1990s, Wal-Mart began to emphasize 
the integration of the company under the intangibles paradigm, and the integration 
 
229 See infra notes 189 to 209 and accompanying text. 
230 DOUG GARR, IBM REDUX: LOUIS GERSTNER AND THE BUSINESS TURNAROUND OF THE DECADE 
19-20 (2000) (noting a plunge in IBM’s stock price of 30 percent between 1990 and 1993 and loss 
of $6 billion in market capitalization). 
231 In addition, IBM was suffering a liquidity crisis.  See Lisa DiCarlo, How Gerstner Got IBM to 
Dance, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2002), at http://www.forbes.com/2002/11/11/cx_ld_1112gerstner.html.  
232 Id.; Garr, supra note 230. 
233 Chairman’s Letter, IBM 1994 ANNUAL REPORT (1995). 
234 Id. at 4. 
235 Id. IBM Annual Reports from 1994 to present are available at 
http://www.ibm.com/investor/financials/annualreport.phtml. 
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of intangibles and ICT technologies in the company.  The former is reflected in 
statements such as “Wal-Mart leads industry in technology and not slowing 
down” and the latter in statements such as “[w]ith this technology, we’re getting 
better, quicker and more accurate information to manage and control every aspect 
of our business . . .”236 
2. Intangibles Paradigm Discourse:  Strategic Behavior and the 
Strategic Intellectual Property Management Literature 
a. Intangibles, Strategic Behaviors and Business 
Transformations 
Intangibles paradigm discourse reflects business practices and strategic behaviors 
with respect to intangibles.  Intangibles are a major source of value for companies 
today in varied business sectors and industries.237 In addition to discussing how 
intangibles should be used strategically and often offensively,238 the strategic 
intellectual property management literature provides guidance about how 
companies can assess and measure intangibles and create organizational structures 
that best enable exploitation of intangibles.239 
One focus of this discussion is how intangibles can be commoditized or 
monetized and translated into major sources of corporate value.240 This literature 
is more than a hypothetical discussion; as Enron and Cisco demonstrate in quite 
different ways, the uses of intangibles in actuality and in representations have real 
consequences for company stockholders, company employees and investors, 
among others. The actual incorporation of intangibles into business operations 
and practices is often expensive and may also require significant initial 
investment.241 In the case of ICTs, for example, such incorporation requires 
 
236 WAL-MART 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, at 13.  Wal-Mart annual reports from 1970 to present are 
available at 
http://www.walmartstores.com/wmstore/wmstores/Mainnews.jsp?pagetype=news&categoryOID=
-8775&template=DisplayAllContents.jsp.  My review of the company’s annual reports found that 
such statements became more evident in Wal-Mart Annual Reports after the mid-1990s.  For 
further discussion of Wal-Mart and the intangibles paradigm, see infra notes 384 to 395 and 
accompanying text. 
237 See supra notes 158 to 163 and accompanying text.  
238 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29 (discussing strategic business uses of 
intangibles). 
239 Id.; see also supra notes 119 and 221. 
240 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29.  The commoditization and monetization of 
assets was also a core feature of Enron’s strategy.  See infra notes 349 to 383 and accompanying 
text. 
241 See DeLong et al., supra note 20, at 40; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, supra note 180. 
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significant time for implementation and training of personnel or customers who 
might use ICT products that are integrated into company processes and standard 
practices.  An actual transition to intangibles paradigm business practices thus 
involves far more than discourse. 242 Current disclosure requirements, however, 
because they do not adequately reflect the economic reality of the intangibles 
paradigm, do not require provision of information that would enable better 
verification of the actual reality of a company’s transition to intangibles paradigm 
business practices as opposed to a company’s representations of this reality.243 
The transformations in business practice associated with the intangibles paradigm 
also have an external dimension.  As a result, one aspect of the intangibles 
paradigm and ICT era has been the development of at times cartel-like formations 
of industries that have grown in the shadow of intellectual property rules.244 
Inadequate disclosure standards for intangibles may also influence company 
behavior and force companies to use signaling to convey the value they derive 
from intangibles.245 This is particularly the case since current accounting and 
disclosure standards do not adequately measure the value of intangibles.  
Consequently, as a result of differential accounting treatment of intangibles and 
the inadequacy of current measurement and disclosure standards with respect to 
intangibles,246 companies with significant amounts of intangible assets “face the 
rather formidable task of credibly signaling firm value to investors and 
shareholders.”247 This need to signal company value has influenced strategic 
 
242 See, e.g., Lev, supra note 2, at 132; van Ark, supra note 26, at 17 (noting that successful ICT 
implementation is facilitated by investments in organizational capital); Brynjolfsson & Hitt, supra 
note 180, at 23 (commenting that investment in information technology often complements 
organizational changes in companies, including changes in business processes and work 
practices). 
243 See Lev, supra note 6 (noting the lack of requirement for meaning disclosure from companies 
about intangibles). 
244 See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM (2002); 
Goldfinger, supra note 44, at 210-211 (speaking of coopetition, the coexistence of competition 
and cooperation, that is often characteristic under the intangibles paradigm); BRONWYN H. HALL,
BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS, INNOVATION AND POLICY 11 (Inst. Bus. & Econ. Res., Dept. of 
Econ., U. Cal. Berkeley, Paper No. E03-331, 2003) (noting that the patent system tends to 
influence industrial organization), at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/econ/E03-331.   
245 Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625. 627 (2002) (framing patents as a way of 
credibly publicizing information); R. Polk Wagner & Gideon Parchamovsky, Patent Portfolios,
154 U. PA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (discussing a portfolio theory of patenting), available 
at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/research/details.cfm?search=1&detail=1&research_id=1545
#. 
246 See infra notes 265 to 298 and accompanying text. 
247 David S. Gelb & Philip Siegel, Intangible Assets and Corporate Signaling, 15 REV.
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCOUNTING 307, 321 (2000). 
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behaviors reflected in how companies talk about and use intangibles.248 Through 
skillful use of intangibles paradigm discourse, some companies have been able to 
effectively position themselves under the intangibles paradigm and achieve 
significant increases in market valuations as a consequence.249 
b. Intangibles Paradigm Discourse and Practice at Enron 
Enron’s accounting for its Blockbuster venture demonstrates its use of intangibles 
paradigm discourse.250 In July 2000, Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay announced 
the formation of a 20-year deal involving a venture with Blockbuster Inc. that 
would allow consumers to have movies sent via telephone lines to watch on 
televisions at home.  The partnership was announced with great fanfare and 
described as the “ultimate bricks-clicks-and-flicks strategy.”251 Without 
Blockbuster’s knowledge, within months of making the deal with Blockbuster, 
Enron had set up the Braveheart affiliated partnership and obtained a $115.2 
million investment in the Braveheart partnership from CIBC World Markets in 
exchange for CIBC’s receiving a promise of future earnings from Enron’s share 
of the Blockbuster partnership for 10 years.252 Within eight months of this 
announcement, the partners had split, with Enron blaming Blockbuster for not 
getting big movie studios to sign licensing deals for the most popular titles.253 
Even though the Braveheart partnership had no separate staff or operations other 
than Enron’s stake in the Blockbuster venture, “Enron claimed $110.9 million in 
profits from Braveheart in the fourth quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 
2001.”254 Braveheart was never more than a pilot project and never had any 
significant number of paying customers.255 When Enron formed Braveheart in 
December 2000, it “assigned the partnership a value of $124.8 million based on 
its projections of the revenue and earnings potential of the Blockbuster 
venture.”256 Although Enron’s behavior was at best a serious misrepresentation, 
Enron’s actions do reveal something about the nature and flexibility that 
 
248 Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29. 
249 Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29. 
250 See Rebecca Smith, Show Business: A Blockbuster Deal Shows How Enron Overplayed its 
Hand, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2002); see also McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 291-295 
(describing the Braveheart transaction in detail). 
251 See Smith, supra note 250.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
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companies may have in manipulating even illusory intangibles that is not as 
readily available to them for tangible assets. 
In contrast to a tangible asset business model, which might involve setting up 
physical retail locations, the proposed Blockbuster venture was an ICT focused 
business endeavor that included a significant service component.  As such, it 
illustrates the types of business transactions that have become typical under the 
intangibles paradigm.  This combination of an ICT intensive business transaction 
with a significant service component means, however, that far less about this 
transaction would be required to be disclosed from an accounting perspective than 
would typically be the case in a business transaction that involved physical retail 
locations.  This differential treatment makes verification of underlying economic 
reality often more difficult in the context of intangibles paradigm business 
practices.  The types of unverifiable intangibles evident in the Enron Blockbuster 
case make financial statements difficult to audit.257 They also make it much more 
difficult for investors to rely upon financial statement numbers as true measures 
of the economic value of an enterprise. 
Enron exemplifies how skillful use of a particular discourse combined with 
complexity in financial structure and presentation magnified the accounting haze 
and obscured the company’s activities in a way that facilitated fraud.258 Enron’s 
misrepresentations occurred in a broader environment in which many who should 
have examined Enron’s accounting and business practices with greater care, 
including analysts and financial reporters, were to a large extent captive to the 
impressions that Enron sought to project.259 Enron was thus quite effective in 
representing itself as a new economy company despite the fact that the reality of 
its business practices did not support this representation.260 
257 See Joshua Rosen, Editorial: Policy Reforms in the Aftermath of Accounting Scandals, 21 J. 
ACCOUNTING & PUB. POL’Y 281, 284 (2002). 
258 In addition to creating extremely complex financial structures, Enron also used derivates 
extensively.  This combination made deciphering Enron’s financial statements quite challenging 
for even the most financially sophisticated readers.  See infra notes 360 to 369 and accompanying 
text. 
259 See Scott Sherman, Enron-Gimme an ‘E’!: Uncovering the Uncovered Story,” COLUMBIA 
JOURNALISM REV. (Mar./Apr. 2002) at ___ available at http://www.cjr.org/issues/2002/2/enron-
sherman.asp (noting that analysts and newspapers such as the Wall Street Journal, Forbes,
Fortune and Worth rushed to embrace Enron in the late 1990s in “a universe where applause 
obliterated skepticism”). 
260 Id. at ___ (noting that reporters and analysts “who plunged into Enron’s finances became 
instantly suspicious about what they found”). 
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Enron was not alone in its use of aggressive accounting practices, although it was 
atypical in the scope and dimension of the fraud and misrepresentation involved 
in its accounting and representations. 261 During the late 1990s, many companies 
used aggressive accounting practices, which resulted in an unprecedented number 
of financial restatements. 262  Financial restatements occur when companies 
acknowledge that prior financial statements were inaccurate and release financial 
statements reflecting the correct numbers.263 
The shift to an intangibles paradigm in both its metaphysical or worldview and 
sociological or operational aspects is a particularly important one from which to 
consider the operation of systems of rules that regulate business behavior. This 
fundamental paradigm shift is an important context in which many current ICT 
era regulatory debates should be placed.  Understanding the core aspects of this 
paradigm shift requires looking at the operation of existing categories and rules 
under the intangibles paradigm. 
 
261 See Lawrence Revsine, Enron:  Sad but Inevitable, 21 J. ACCOUNTING & PUB. POL’Y 137, 138 
(2002) (characterizing Enron debacle as an extreme example of selective financial 
misrepresentation that is inevitable in the current financial reporting environment); George J. 
Bentson & Al L. Hartgraves, Enron: What Happened and What We Can Learn From It, 21 J. 
ACCOUNTING & PUB. POL’Y 105 (2002) (outlining Enron’s complex financial structures and 
transactions and looking at their affects on Enron’s financial statements). 
262 See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 
1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 282-285 (2004) (noting increase in earnings restatements of more 
than 250% in the five years ending in 2002); GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 4; see also infra 
notes 334 to 345 and accompanying text. 
263 GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 2 (discussing and analyzing financial restatements, which are 
defined as entailing corrections of accounting irregularities that result in material misstatements of 
financial results). 
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III. THE INTANGIBLES “HAZE”: MEASURING AND DESCRIBING INTANGIBLES 
The existing reporting model is not well suited to identifying and reporting 
on key value and risk elements inherent in our twenty-first century 
knowledge-based economy. . .despite the continuing efforts of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and SEC to enhance financial 
reporting, changes in the business environment—such as the growth in 
information technology, new types of relationships between companies, and 
the increasing use of complex business transactions and financial 
instruments—constantly threaten the relevance of financial statements and 
pose a formidable challenge for standard setters.264 
A. Capital Asset or Current Expense?: Differential Accounting Treatment of 
Intangibles 
The intangibles haze refers to the fact that current accounting treatment of 
intangibles often results in financial statements that are unclear and not reflective 
of underlying economic reality.  Accounting systems present companies with a set 
of guidelines or rules that are then used to present and explain the company’s 
financial status and transactions for both internal and external purposes.265 
Depending on the nature of the transaction, a company may have an ability to 
frame or engage in self-presentation and have potentially varying degrees of 
flexibility in how it accounts for the transaction.266 In addition, tax accounting for 
the same transaction might be entirely different.267 The fundamental assumption 
of the current accounting system is that assets are often valued at historical 
cost.268 
Debates over the accounting treatment of intangibles are certainly not new and 
date back some 100 years.269 The appropriate accounting treatment for 
intangibles remains a hotly debated topic in FASB, the academic accounting 
 
264 Id. at 57. 
265 See supra notes 124 to 136 and accompanying text. 
266 Mundstock, supra note 30, at 839 (noting that flexibility of accounting standards means that 
accounts need only be acceptable, not correct, which serves the interests of accountants and 
corporate managers but is contrary to the needs of investors). 
267 See, e.g., Luppino, supra note 100, at 35 (discussing synthetic lease transaction in which the 
corporation is a tenant for financial statement accounting or book purposes, but an owner for tax 
purposes, which enables companies to avoid putting debt on their balance sheets for financial 
statement purposes); see also supra notes 100 to 111 and accompanying text. 
268 See Mundstock, supra note 30, at 813. 
269 Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 19; Smith & Parr, supra note 40, at 89 (noting that 
accountants have long grappled with how to treat intangibles in financial statements). 
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literature and the popular press.270 The focus of this debate has centered around 
whether intangibles should be treated as an operating expense reflected on a 
company’s income statement or a capital expense recorded on a company’s 
balance sheet.271 
Current U.S. accounting rules result in a mix of market and book (historical) 
values.272 Accounting treatment of company expenses exemplifies this mixture.  
A company’s expenses may be characterized as operating, financing or capital 
expenses.273 Operating expenses are expenses that relate to the current period such 
as labor costs and are subtracted from revenues during such period to determine a 
company’s operating earnings.274 Financing expenses would include expenses 
associated with nonequity financings such as debt and would include interest 
expense, for example.275 Financing expenses are deducted from operating 
earnings to estimate net income.276 Capital expenses create assets, characterized 
as assets because they are expected to generate benefits over multiple periods.277 
Such assets are placed on the balance sheet.278 The value of such capital assets is 
then and written off or deducted on a company’s income statement over their 
estimated useful life through depreciation (physical assets) or amortization 
(intangibles).279 The remaining net value of such capital assets remains on a 
company’s balance sheet as the capital asset is depreciated or amortized.  A 
distinction exists generally between treatment of expenses relating to investments 
in intangibles as opposed to tangible items, with intangible expenses being largely 
operating expenses while tangible expenses are to a far greater extent treated as 
capital expenses.280 As a result, in the case of intangibles, even expenses that are 
 
270 See Chandra Kanodia, Haresh Sapra & Raghu Venugopalan, Should Intangibles Be Measured:  
What are the Economic Trade-Offs?, 42 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 89, 90 (2004). 
271 Id. 
272 See Wallman, supra note 301; Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 33-35.
273 See Damodaran, supra note 168, at 1. 
274 Id. at 1-2. 
275 Id.
276 Id. at 2. 
277 Hawkins, supra note 12, at 50 (noting that assets represent “probable future, measurable 
economic benefits which the reporting entity has acquired through a current or past transaction.”); 
Carney, supra note 12, at 11 (noting that assets are things owned by a business that only include 
“probable future economic benefits owned or controlled by the business, that are obtained in a 
“transaction” to which accountants can attach a price.”). 
278 Carney, supra note 12, at 10 (noting that a balance sheet “reflects the firm’s ownership of 
assets, and the claims against them, on a stated date.”). 
279 Id. at 1-2, 4. 
280 Lev, supra note 18, at 81 (noting that tangible resources are considered assets while the 
intangibles are typically expensed). 
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expected to generate benefits over multiple periods are often treated as operating 
expenses rather than capital expenses.281 
In the realm of accounting treatment of intangibles, however, a further distinction 
exists between treatment of internally generated intangibles and purchased 
intangibles.282 Purchased intangibles such as those acquired from a target 
company in a merger or acquisition, for example, are capitalized and placed on a 
company’s balance sheet.283 In contrast, most internally generated intangibles are 
expensed and appear on a company’s income statement as operating expenses.284 
Examples of internally generated intangibles would include knowledge generated 
from a company’s research and development, for example, which for many ICT 
oriented and biotechnology companies represents the vast majority of the 
company’s value.  Such internally generated intangible expenses are typically 
expensed, which means that they are essentially treated in the same manner as 
overhead expenses such as salary, for example, and reported as an expense on the 
company’s income statement typically during the year in which the expenditure 
occurs.  The company’s net income or profit during the year in which this 
deduction occurs would then be reduced to reflect this expenditure.  Yet other 
internally generated intangibles are not separately identified in financial 
statements at all, but are also treated as operating expenses.285 The differential 
treatment of purchased and internally generated intangibles would mean that the 
same intangible resource might receive different accounting treatment depending 
on whether a company purchased it or developed it internally. 
U.S. accounting rules do not generally permit companies to capitalize intangibles 
and place them on the company’s balance sheet unless the intangibles are 
purchased intangibles.286 As a result, GAAP would require that a company 
 
281 See infra note 286 and accompanying text; Hawkins, supra note 12, at 591 (noting that due 
conservatism in application of accounting principles, intangible asset costs are typically written off 
as incurred, or if capitalized, amortized over a relatively short time period). 
282 See Kanodia et al., supra note 270, at 90. 
283 See FASB, Statement of Accounting Standards No. 141, Business Combinations ¶¶ 47-51 
(June 2001) (hereinafter, “FASB 141”) (discussing appropriate accounting treatment for intangible 
assets in a merger or acquisition context). 
284 Kanodia et al., supra note 270, at 90. 
285 Id. at ___. 
286 For an overview of the rules and principles relevant to the accounting treatment of intangible 
assets, see FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142, Goodwill and Other 
Intangible Assets ¶¶ 9-10 (June 2001) (hereinafter,  “FASB 142”) (discussing accounting 
treatment of goodwill and intangibles generally); FASB 141, supra note 283; FASB, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 2, Accounting for Research and Development Costs ¶12 (Oct. 
1974) (requiring expensing of most research and development costs); see also Shyam 
Vallabhajosyula, Appendix A: Accounting Rules and Regulations for Intangibles, in INTANGIBLES 
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capitalize purchases of computer hardware and certain types of software 
developed internally, but would have the company expense the other costs such as 
computer installation, business process development and investments in 
associated intangibles.287 Even when GAAP permits capitalization of 
intangibles,288 companies do not for the most part capitalize intangibles unless the 
intangibles are being acquired in a merger or acquisition context.289 Since 
intangibles are in most cases not capitalized, the assets that are capitalized and 
that end up on a company’s balance sheet are typically primarily the company’s 
tangible assets, such as the computer hardware in the example discussed above.290 
This differential treatment of tangible assets and intangibles is significant for 
several reasons.  It tends to result in distortions of reported financial statements 
because such financial statements do not accurately reflect the true economic 
value of many business enterprises.  This is one reason a gap may arise between 
the market value of a company and the book value of the company’s assets as 
reported on a company’s balance sheet.291 Measures of a company’s performance 
will then also be distorted,292 which may influence on measures of corporate 
performance such as earnings per share, return on assets and return on income.293 
135-154 (Baruch Lev, 2001) (discussing Accounting Practices Board Opinion No. 17, Intangible 
Assets, which FASB 142 superseded, but which contained an essentially similar requirement with 
respect to expensing of internally developed intangibles) (hereinafter, “Vallabhajosyula”); 
Hawkins, supra note 12, at 591 (noting that acquired intangibles are capitalized and amortized 
over two or more periods, while internally developed intangibles are typically expensed as 
incurred, rather than capitalized).  The U.S. treatment of intangibles may be contrasted with the 
European standard evident in IAS No. 38, which has a different standard for the capitalization of 
intangibles, and which permits recognition of internally generated intangibles in certain limited 
circumstances. See IAS 38, supra note 41. 
287 Sinkyu Yang & Erik Brynjolfsson, Intangible Assets and Growth Accounting: Evidence from 
Computer Investments 3 (2000), at 
http://ebusiness.mit.edu/research/papers/136%20erikb,%20Intangible%20assets.pdf.  
288 Under FASB rules, companies are required to but rarely capitalize certain software 
development costs. See FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 86, Accounting 
for the Costs of Computer Software to Be Sold, Leased, or Otherwise Marketed (Aug. 1985); see 
also Vallabhajosyula, supra note 286, at 137-138. 
289 In a merger or acquisition context, the difference between the amount the acquiring company 
pays for the acquired company and the book value of the acquired company’s assets would be 
recorded on the acquiring company’s balance sheet as goodwill.   See FASB 141, supra note 286. 
290 See Lev, supra note 18, at 79-103. 
291 See Lev, supra note 169, at 18; see supra notes 165 to 188 and accompanying text. 
292 Such measures of performance would include the return on equity, return on assets and net 
income. See Lev, supra note 169, at 18; see also infra notes 293 to 295 and accompanying text. 
293 See Mundstock, supra note 30, at 830 (“All costs of internal R&D are to be treated as a current 
expense rather than treated as an investment, like buying an asset. For this reason, as discussed 
above, a high-tech company shows few assets and can look like it is losing money even if it is 
doing quite well.”). 
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The degree and direction of these inaccuracies will depend on the type of 
company and nature of the company’s business.294 Current accounting treatment 
of intangibles results, for example, in the characterization of research and 
development expenditures as operating expenses, which generally lowers 
operating income and net income.295 In firms where research and development 
expenses have increased rapidly over time, treating expenses associated with 
intangibles in a similar fashion to tangible expenditures would result in 
reclassification of operating expenses as capital expenses, which would decrease 
operating expenses, thus increasing operating income and likely causing return on 
capital to increase.296 In contrast, in mature firms with stable research and 
development expenses, the return on capital may decrease with the 
reclassification of research and development expenses.297 
The influence of accounting treatment on measures of company performance is 
often particularly significant for companies in the ICT sector because their 
relative expenditures on intangibles are often higher.  As a result of differential 
treatment of tangible and intangibles resources, true role of intangibles in for 
businesses today far too often remains ill-defined and hazy and, even more 
importantly, not transparent.298 
B. Accounting Systems and Information:  Disclosure and Decision Making 
Under the Intangibles Paradigm 
A major purpose of financial accounting systems is provision of information that 
can be used to make decisions.299 These systems, for example, constitute major 
sources of information for investors,300 as well as for internal decision making 
purposes.  Investors may look at company ratios and performance measures such 
as return on assets, return on equity or earnings measures, to make a 
determination as to whether to undertake or maintain an existing investment in a 
particular company. 
 
294 See Lev, supra note 169, at 18.
295 Damodaran, supra note 168, at 4, 21. 
296 Id. at 23. 
297 Id. at 23. 
298 See Lev, supra note 18, at 37-42, 89-90. 
299 Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 4; see also Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112, at 175-177 
(noting that in contrast to nineteenth and early twentieth century, when accounting innovations 
were initiated by industrialists and practitioners, writing in management accounting since 1920 has 
been dominated by academics emphasizing simple decision-making models in highly simplified 
forms). 
300 Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 4. 
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The rise of intangibles has highlighted potential deficiencies in existing 
accounting rules as is evident in the fact that United States GAAP has essentially 
not fully confronted the reality of this new paradigm.301 This failure to come to 
terms has been a factor in recent prominent corporate scandals.302 A common 
backdrop to these scandals was a business environment where companies were 
able to commit fraud by taking advantage of the fact that existing accounting and 
disclosure rules do not adequately reflect the reality of business practices today, 
particularly with regard to the roles now played by intangibles in such practices. 
The ability of such companies to promote inaccurate representations of economic 
reality and inflate financial results is in no small part due to gaps in current 
accounting treatment of and disclosure requirements with respect to intangibles.303 
The systematic distortions in accounting measures and disclosure that are 
characteristic under the intangibles paradigm can influence investment and 
managerial decisions.304 For example, the fact that accounting systems do not 
adequately measure the economic reality and the role played by intangibles is a 
critical factor in the market to book gap.  In the absence of other adequate 
explanations, market participants may tend to perceive this gap as reflective of the 
value of intangibles, which may or may not be an accurate assessment of 
underlying economic reality.  Distorted accounting combined with accounting 
fixation mean that persons looking at and making decisions on the basis of 
distorted financial statements, even those with an understanding of accounting, 
may not see through the skewed numbers to the underlying economic reality.305 
This is problematic because it leaves more room for companies themselves to use 
framing and presentation to present alternate representations of reality that are not 
contradicted by measures that can be made using existing reporting and disclosure 
requirements.  This gives companies far more leeway that might exist with respect 
to tangibles paradigm business practices to fill this gap and influence how this gap 
 
301 See Wallman, supra note 63. 
302 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light 
Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (discussing corporate scandals at 
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and Qwest). 
303 See infra notes 349 to 383 for a discussion of Enron. 
304 Baruch Lev, Bharat Sarath & Theodore Sougiannis, R&D Reporting Biases And Their 
Consequences 4 (Dec. 1999), at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/knowledge&shareholdervalue.doc.  
305 See Joan L. Luft & Michael D. Shields, Why Does Fixation Persist, in INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
415-446 (John R.M. Hand & Baruch Lev eds., 2003) (discussing influence of learning on 
individuals’ judgments about effects of intangibles). 
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might be perceived.306 Financial statements actually rooted in and more accurately 
representative of the underlying economic reality of the company are critical to 
the operation of regulatory structures that govern company behavior under the 
intangibles paradigm. 
The inherent distortions in current accounting measures of intangibles are 
magnified by generally inadequate disclosure by businesses about intangibles.307 
Companies may disclose little publicly or specifically, for example, about 
research and development or other innovative activities or the revenues or 
expenses generated by such activities.308 Moreover, when more detailed 
information is revealed, it often occurs in contexts such as business magazines, in 
which companies have significant ability to determine the positioning and nature 
of disclosures made.309 The lack of detailed disclosure with respect to intangibles 
means that it can be difficult to know how intangibles are actually implemented in 
a particular business organization, which might be one window from which to 
view and verify the specific operational and true economic contribution of 
intangibles.310 The resulting accounting haze thus gives companies a significant 
amount of latitude to choose how to frame and situate themselves within the 
intangibles paradigm from the perspective of financial statements and other 
disclosure documents. 
Much like the FASB requirements with respect to treatment of and disclosure 
about intangibles in company financial statements, SEC regulations governing 
company preparation of financial statements require very limited disclosure about 
intangibles.311 Although discussion of intangibles may be required by general 
guidelines concerning preparation of financial statements, the most substantial 
explicit reference to intangible assets appears in the balance sheet preparation 
 
306 See Lev, supra note 18, at 101 (noting that a temptation exists for companies to change the 
level of intangibles investment to manage reported earnings to meet and exceed the expectations 
of analysts). 
307 See Lev, supra note 6, at 112. 
308 Id. (noting that no information is disclosed about investments in intangibles or revenue 
generated by such investments, such as patent-licensing fees or shares of revenue coming from 
new products). 
309 Baruch Lev, Research and Development and Capital Markets, 11 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 21, 21 
(1999).   
310 Id. (noting that lack of disclosure leaves investors in the dark about how companies allocate 
resources with respect to research and development budgets, product development, amounts 
involved in other intangibles, including software development and acquisition, brand enhancement 
and employee training). 
311 See Shorter, supra note 46, at 4 (noting that Regulation S-X outlines the standards that 
registered public companies and their accountants must follow in generating financial statements). 
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requirements in SEC Regulation S-X, which requires the following disclosure 
with respect to intangibles: 
15. Intangible assets.  State separately each class of such assets which 
is in excess of five percent of the total assets, along with the basis of 
determining the respective amounts.  Any significant addition or deletion 
shall be explained in a note.312 
Sarbanes-Oxley, adopted on July 30, 2002, significantly modified the corporate 
governance, accounting and disclosure requirements for companies with publicly 
traded securities.313 Although adopted largely in response to several corporate 
scandals in which intangibles were a factor in corporate deception or fraud, 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC rules promulgated under Sarbanes-Oxley do not 
contain specific requirements with respect to intangibles or accounting more 
generally.314 Sarbanes-Oxley may, however, have an impact on the quality of 
corporate-level disclosure about intangibles as a consequence of the requirements 
for criminal and civil certifications of financial statements and company 
disclosures by Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers and civil 
and criminal penalties if such certifications prove false. 315 At the same time, 
however, disclosure with respect to intangibles is further complicated by the 
uncertainty often inherent in intangibles, which may potentially expose companies 
to securities law liability in the event that predictions about intangibles should 
prove incorrect.316 
312 See 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-02.  Other references to intangibles or intangible assets in Regulation S-
X are quite specialized, including references in relation to accumulated depreciation, excess cost 
over intangible assets required and other assets that constitute greater than 30 percent of 
stockholders’ equity, intangible drilling and development costs and intangible utility plants of 
public utilities.  Regulation S-K disclosure requirements with respect to narrative descriptions of a 
business require the registered company to disclose “[t]he importance to the segment and the 
duration and effect of all patents, trademarks, licenses, franchises and concessions held,” 17 
C.F.R. § 229.101(1)(iv), as well as requirements with respect to required exhibits relating to 
material contracts involving patents and other intangibles. 
313 See Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 31; see also Michael A. Perino, Some Reflections on the 
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671 (2002) 
(assessing the deterrence value of Sarbanes Oxley). 
314 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
315 Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 31, at §§ 302, 906.  See also Presentation of Stacey Rabbino, Esq., 
Chief Intellectual Property Counsel of Verisign, Inc., IP Asset Management After Sarbanes-Oxley,
Slides 9, 22 (Sept. 9, 2003), at www.kilpatrickstockton.com/news/events/presentations/ 09-09-
03%20IP%20Mangement%20and%20Sarbox.ppt (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley requires that 
intellectual assets must be reported). 
316 Blair & Wallman, supra note 158. 
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C. Verifiability and Transparency under the Intangibles Paradigm:  The 
Usefulness of Financial Statements 
Differential accounting treatment and current disclosure requirements have a 
significant effect on the transparency and verifiability of the economic reality of 
intangible resources.  Lack of information about and coherent standards with 
respect to intangibles makes it more difficult to measure, independently evaluate 
and verify the true role that intangibles play in a particular business 
organization.317 From an information perspective, then, the actual basis 
underlying any company-specific market to book gap may not be truly 
ascertainable nor is it certain that accounting rules will adequately capture the true 
sources of value for businesses operating under an intangibles paradigm.  As a 
result, companies may have greater ability to characterize and frame themselves 
in such a way as to emphasize the importance of intangibles and manage earnings 
accordingly, with the knowledge that the nature of the accounting system makes 
such characterizations less transparent and more difficult to verify.318 Such 
characterizations may be given more credence than they might otherwise have, 
thus making intangibles more susceptible to manipulation than is the case with 
tangible assets. 
By emphasizing the importance of intangibles from a business and operational 
perspective, a firm can also attempt to maximize the influence of such assets on 
overall firm market value, regardless of whether this emphasis reflects economic 
reality.319 One study of firms with high advertising and research and development 
expenditures found that because such firms are more likely to view mandatory 
GAAP disclosures as inadequate, they are more likely to focus on alternative 
 
317 Van Ark, supra note 26, at 13 (“Despite its recognized importance, the problems concerning 
the conceptualization of intangible capital, its measurement and integration into a production 
function or growth accounting framework are still huge and largely unresolved.”). The market 
appears to be able to value research and development investments and market valuations of 
research and development positively related to estimates of firm value. See Baruch Lev & Paul 
Zarowin, The Market Valuation of R&D Expenditures 29, (Dec. 1998), at 
www.stern.nyu.edu/~blev/research.html. 
318 Bratton, supra note 33, at 1052 (“Financial statements and footnotes are very summary 
documents.  Decision making about treatments goes on in a black box, evolving as a matter of 
practice amongst insiders.  There is no comparable moment of transparency respecting the law-to-
fact application.  This diminishes the chance for outside evaluation”) (citations omitted). 
319 Id. at 1039 (“Readers of financial reports are not on notice to bring skepticism to bear, at least 
until very recently.  Even if they proceed cautiously, they get only indirect means, within the 
reports’ four corners, with which to sort number influenced by advocacy from harder numbers 
uninfluenced by management’s agenda.”). 
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disclosures to signal company value, including financial signals such as share 
repurchases and dividends.320 
Signaling behaviors with respect to intangibles and intellectual property are 
another way in which companies signal markets concerning an aggressive value 
maximizing approach to development and enforcement of rights with respect to 
intangibles, including intellectual property rights.321 Such behaviors have been 
used by The SCO Group, for example, in its assertions of rights emanating from 
copyright claims with respect to Linux code.322 Such assertions of legal rights in 
this context were initially associated with an increase in stock price of more than 
700 percent.323 
One significant consequence of the intangibles haze has been the decline in the 
usefulness of financial statements for investors, on account of their failure to 
accurately reflect economic value and underlying economic reality.324 This has 
implications for regulatory regimes governing business and consequently may 
undercut such financial regulatory measures.  One aspect of the greater risk and 
uncertainty of intangibles from an accounting perspective relates to the fact that 
companies often lack full control over intangibles.325 Intangibles are also often 
 
320 See Gelb & Siegel, supra note, 247, at 309-310. 
321 See Arewa, Strategic Behaviors, supra note 29 (discussing series of five lawsuits involving 
IBM, Novell, RedHat, Daimler-Chrysler and Autozone, connected to SCO’s assertions of rights). 
322 Id. (noting that SCO does not in fact own Unix copyrights) 
323 Id.
324 Cañibano et al., supra note 41, at 30 (“Failure to correctly reflect the impact of intangibles on 
the current and future performance of the business implies that accounting statements fail to 
present an unbiased (true and fair) view of the firm’s financial position. Therefore, investors are 
provided with non-relevant and non-comparable financial statements and will most likely not be 
able to assess the value of companies to make efficient resource allocation decisions.”); Amir & 
Lev, supra note 163 (suggesting that financial information alone is irrelevant for valuation of 
cellular companies because of accounting measurement and reporting system cannot provide 
value-relevant information because of high level of intangibles in wireless industry, although 
financial information combined with nonfinancial information does help explain market prices); 
Francis & Schipper, supra note 163 (noting that the explanatory power of earnings levels has 
significantly declined over time); Johnson & Kaplan, supra note 112 (giving overview of why 
accounting measures no longer provide relevant or appropriate measures of business operations); 
Lev & Zarowin, supra note 121, at 2 (noting that usefulness of financial information has declined 
over the last 20 years); but c.f. Brett Trueman, M.H. Franco Wong & Xiao Jun Zhao, The Eyeballs 
Have It: Searching for the Value in Internet Stocks, 38 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 137 (2000) (noting 
that although Internet company stock values are not associated with net income, but rather a 
relationship between exists between gross profit and stock market prices, suggesting that investors 
may just value such companies differently). 
325 Lev, supra note 18, at 83. 
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difficult to measure, quantify and value.326 For this reason, the verifiability of 
intangible assets is an important question, and verifiability problems exist with 
respect to intangibles as compared to tangible resources.327 Verifiability thus 
provides an important behavioral check in the world of tangible assets that is far 
too often not available to the same extent for intangibles.  GAAP has been 
characterized as a blend of uninformative and largely verifiable descriptions of 
past transactions and informative and largely unverifiable projections of future 
income.328 Intangibles typically fall into the latter category.329 
The ways in which accounting rules have been applied in the intangibles 
paradigm context has tended to create a haze of uncertainty, with few standards 
for reliable disclosure concerning intangibles.330 This vacuum has been filled at 
least to some extent by business framing and discourse controlled by companies 
that seek to position themselves within the intangibles paradigm in an attempt to 
maximize firm market value. 331 This background is instructive in considering 
examples involving the use of intangibles in specific business contexts under the 
intangibles paradigm. 
IV. INTANGIBLES IN BUSINESS DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: SOME 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTANGIBLES HAZE 
The internal generation of many intangibles may pose concerns for transparency 
and verifiability.  Even if the expenditures for an intangible can be accurately 
measured, questions may continue to exist concerning the verifiability of the asset 
or resource.  One reason historically that accounting systems did not capitalize 
intangibles was as a result of fear of uncertainty.332 In addition, accountants do 
 
326 Gelb & Siegel, supra note, 247. 
327 This lesser degree of verifiability is rooted in the risks, uncertainty and lack of transparency 
that is typical of intangibles today.  See Lev, supra note 18, at 37-42, 89-90 (noting risks, 
uncertainty and lack of transparency that is typical of intangibles). 
328 See Rosen, supra note 257, at 84.   
329 See Lev, supra note 18, at 81 (“practically every material item on the balance sheet and income 
statement, with the exception of cash, is based on subjective estimates about future events”). 
330 Several countries and companies have, however, implemented schemas or strategies for dealing 
with intangibles.  See, e.g., P.N. Bukh, H.T. Larsen & J. Mouritsen, Constructing Intellectual 
Capital Statements, 17 SCAND. J. MGMT 87 (2001) (analyzing development of intellectual capital 
statements at 19 Danish firms); Danish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Intellectual Capital 
Statements – The New Guidelines (Feb. 2003) (setting forth guidelines for preparing intellectual 
capital statements), at http://www.videnskabsministeriet.dk/cgi-bin/theme-
list.cgi?theme_id=100650&_lang=uk. 
331 See infra notes 349 to 383 and accompanying text for discussion regarding Enron. 
332 See Damodaran, supra note 168, at 3 (noting that the rationale for expensing R&D is the belief 
that benefits are uncertain and may occur only when research leads to a commercial product). 
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not always have the expertise that might be needed to appropriately address the 
role of intangibles in business organizations.333 As a result, a broad range of 
potential issues that arise under the intangibles paradigm. 
A. The Intangibles Paradigm and Management of Earnings  
1. The Intangibles Paradigm and Aggressive Accounting Practices 
Because existing regulatory frameworks do not fully take account of the 
intangibles paradigm, the advent of this paradigm has enabled certain companies 
to obfuscate their financial reporting and increased their capacity to engage in 
fraud.334 This was particularly evident in the late 1990s during the height of the 
market bubble when a significant number of companies engaged in “creative” 
accounting practices.335 Such creative accounting practices and the manifest 
fraud at companies such as Enron, were facilitated by the application or 
misapplication of existing financial reporting and securities disclosure 
requirements.336 These practices thus reflect how current rules and regulatory 
structures can be manipulated in the context of intangibles paradigm business 
practices.  This ability to manipulate such structures is in large part due to the fact 
that such structures do not adequately contemplate the intangibles paradigm: 
 
333 See Mundstock, supra note 30, at 831 (noting that one reason SFAS 2 requires that all 
intangibles be expensed is that accountants lack the expertise to evaluate key intangible assets and 
want to protect their turf). 
334 In this respect, the intangibles paradigm presents opportunities for financial engineering that 
may be distinguishable from accounting manipulation.  See Dharan, supra note 91, at 111 (noting 
that lack of disclosure transparency is one consequence of financial engineering, which may be 
distinguished from accounting manipulation). 
335 See Coffee, supra note 262, at 282-285 (noting that most common cause of restatements was 
efforts of management to prematurely recognize income); Lorraine Magrath & Leonard G. Weld, 
Abusive Earnings Management and Early Warning Signs, CPA J. ONLINE (Aug. 2004) (discussing 
earnings management practices), at 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2002/0802/features/f085002.htm. 
336 See Bratton, supra note 32, at 1055 (“GAAP’s present rules, applied in good faith, were more 
than adequate to pick up the material misstatements in Enron’s financials.”). 
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Another fundamental problem underlying the recent spate of accounting 
shockers is the fact that GAAP is increasingly out of sync with today’s 
business realities.  The accounting rules were developed in an industrial 
economy, but this is the information age.  How do you precisely measure the 
value of R&D, customer lists, brand names, patents and other intellectual 
property?  Of course, this situation creates opportunities for creativity, like 
the ballooning practice of in-process R&D writeoffs.  Former SEC 
Commissioner Steve Wallman says “GAAP is not broke but is getting 
increasingly rusty.”  Others are less charitable.  Superlawyer Bill Lerach, the 
king of securities class action suits, suggests renaming GAAP “Cleverly 
Rigged Accounting Ploys,’ or CRAP.”337 
The intangibles paradigm has unfolded in a corporate context in which earnings 
management is a widespread practice.338 Once abusive earnings management 
practices begin, managers will typically spend time devising methods to ensure 
that such practices continue.339 Abusive earnings management practices and 
manipulation of GAAP can also be difficult for outsiders to detect.340 Because 
intangibles paradigm financial statements often do not accurately represent 
economic reality, may lack transparency and are often far more difficult to verify, 
the intangibles paradigm represents an additional opportunity for companies to 
manage earnings, manipulate GAAP and in some cases commit fraud.341 This is 
likely one factor in the marked increase in earnings restatements in the five years 
ending in 2002.342 
337 Dowd, supra note 10, at 4. 
338 See Arthur Levitt, The Numbers Game (Sept. 1999), Speech at NYU Center for Law and 
Business, New York, NY (noting that earnings management is a widespread but little-challenged 
custom and includes practices such as “big bath” restructuring charges, creative acquisition 
accounting, cookie jar reserves, immaterial misapplications of accounting principles and the 
premature recognition of revenue), at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt. 
339 Magrath & Weld, supra note 335. 
340 Id.
341 Bratton, supra note 33, at 1023 (“The stock market awakened in 2002 to discover that it no 
longer had numbers it could trust.  Securities issuers, oriented toward shareholder value 
enhancement by the corporate culture of the 1990s, had been adopting aggressive, even fraudulent 
treatments to enhance reported earnings, and their auditors had been doing nothing to stop them.  
So long as the money kept falling out of the sky during the bull market, nobody worried about the 
diminishing independence of auditors.  But what was ignored before 2001 triggered a crisis in 
2002 in markets already reeling on economic fundamentals.  As the audit failures piled up on one 
another, investors lost confidence in managers, market intermediaries and auditors alike.”) 
(citations omitted).  
342 Coffee, supra note 262, at 282-285 (noting increase in earnings restatements of more than 
250% in the five years ending in 2002). 
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One underlying reason for such restatements was aggressive accounting practices, 
particularly in the technology sector.343 Although such aggressive and creative 
accounting practices were by no means new, the intangibles paradigm has made it 
easier for companies to obscure economic reality through varied methods of 
representation, including through use of financial statements, required disclosure 
and intangibles paradigm discourse.344 Consequently, the intersection of 
aggressive accounting practices and the intangibles paradigm provided companies 
with new ways through which financial statements might be creatively adjusted 
and manipulated to both manage earnings and commit fraud. 
In addition to presenting new opportunities for doing business, the intangibles 
paradigm thus presents new opportunities for committing fraud.  A recent study 
by the Financial Executives Research Foundation Inc. (FEI) suggests that 
intangibles intensive companies were consistently found among the top ten in 
terms of market losses resulting from financial restatements in 1998 to 2000.345 In 
2000, five of the top 10 financial restatements involved either technology 
companies or accounting issues relating to intangibles (Microstrategy, Lucent 
Legato, Alphapharma and Avon Products).346 The same was true in 1999 (Yahoo, 
Texas Instruments, BMC Software, Lycos and Xilinx); in 1998, four of the top 10 
financial restatements involved either technology companies or accounting issues 
relating to intangibles (Boston Scientific, Envoy Corp. SmarTalk and Telxon).347 
A number of the restatements described in the FEI study, including Yahoo, BMC 
 
343 See Edward Iwata, More Firms Falsify Revenue To Boost Stocks, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2000) 
(noting widespread “revenue recognition problem” involving falsifying revenue and using 
aggressive accounting practices that was most widespread in the technology sector); Matt Krantz, 
CDNow Gains in Question, USA TODAY (Dec. 6, 1999) (discussing 200% increase in sales for 
ecommerce company CDNow that violated accounting norms by adding value of coupons 
redeemed by customers to revenue); Susan Hwang & Judith Burns, Amazon Says SEC Ends 
Inquiry on Stock Payments by Web Firms, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2002) (discussing end of SEC 
inquiry into Amazon’s accounting treatment of stock payments to the company by Internet 
companies, which Amazon booked as revenue, with no enforcement proceeding recommended); 
Dowd, supra note 80 (noting pernicious and pervasive, but mostly legal, manipulation of 
corporate financial statements to meet or beat analysts’ earning expectations). 
344 See Matt Krantz & Greg Farrell, Fuzzy Accounting Raises Flags, USA TODAY (June 22, 2001) 
(noting pressure for financial performance as important factor in manipulation of financial 
numbers); David Wessel, Why Boardroom Bad Guys Have Now Emerged en Masse, WALL ST. J. 
(June 20, 2002) (noting that the scope and scale of corporate fraud in the late 1990s was surpassed 
only by the years preceding the Great Depression). 
345 See FEI, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of Financial Reporting (June 2001) (reporting a 
spike in restatements that began in 1998, noting that on average 49 restatements occurred in 1997, 
as compared with 91, 150 and 156 in 1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively), available at 
http://www.fei.org/download/QualFinRep-6-13-2k1.ppt.   
346 Id.
347 Id.
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Software and Lycos, related to accounting treatment of in-process research and 
development expenses.348 Although far from conclusive, the FEI results suggest 
that further exploration of the intersection between aggressive accounting 
practices and the intangibles paradigm might be fruitful. 
Enron represents one aspect of use of the intangibles paradigm that reflects a 
difference in both degree and kind.  Enron exemplifies the use of corporate 
representations of economic reality that actually serve to obscure such reality.  
Enron also demonstrates how intangibles paradigm discourse can be used in the 
course of such representations to commit fraud and illustrates the dangers of 
regulatory frameworks that have yet to adjust to the economic reality of new 
business practices. 
2. The Intangibles Paradigm and Fraud at Enron 
Enron was once one of the largest companies in the world.349 For six consecutive 
years from 1996 to 2001, Enron was named by Fortune Magazine as the nation’s 
most innovative company.350 Fortune also ranked Enron in 2001 as one of its “10 
Stocks to Last the Decade.”351 In August 2000, Enron’s stock reached an all time 
high of $90.56 per share (a multiple of 70 times its then reported earnings).352 In 
the one year period from January 2001 to January 2002, the market capitalization 
of Enron decreased by $63 billion.353 In addition, its CEO Jeffrey Skilling 
resigned,354 and Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.  By the time of 
 
348 Id.; see also Huron Consulting Group, supra note 62, at 12 (noting that in-process research and 
development expenses financial statements relate to instances where companies value acquired in-
process research and development using methods inconsistent with those preferred by the SEC). 
349 See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Patton, Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
9, 9 (2002) (noting that Enron was once the seventh largest corporation in America with revenues 
over $100 billion). 
350 See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 127 (2002); Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in 
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 3, 11 (Nancy B. Rappaport & Bala G. 
Dharan eds., 2004); see also Sherman, supra note 259, at ___. 
351 See Van Niel, supra note 350, at 11. 
352 See Alyson Tonge, Lesley Greer & Alan Lawton, The Enron Story: You Can Fool Some of the 
People Some of the Time . . ., 12 BUS. ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW 4, 5 (2003).  Enron received 
laudatory press coverage as well.  See Erin Davies, Enron: The Power’s Back On, FORTUNE (Apr. 
13, 1998); Brian O’Reilly, The Power Merchant, FORTUNE (Apr. 17, 2000).  Since Enron’s 
earnings reflected numbers largely manufactured by Enron, this multiple is quite inaccurate given 
that Enron’s actual earnings were much lower than its reported earnings. 
353 See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 394, 394 (2004). 
354 Bethany McLean, Enron’s Power Crisis, FORTUNE (Sept. 17, 2001). 
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its bankruptcy filing, Enron’s stock price had fallen to $0.29 per share.355 The 
Enron case, although unusual in its magnitude, to some extent reflect aspects of 
business and accounting practices of the time.  One casualty of such practices was 
ultimately Enron’s accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, for whom Enron was the 
last of several accounting mishaps.356 The dramatic fall of Enron occurred during 
a time period in a climate of aggressive accounting practices reflected in, among 
other practices, intangibles paradigm framing and discourse by companies.357 
A number of internal and external factors may have contributed to Enron’s 
financial collapse and bankruptcy filing, including inadequate deterrence by 
gatekeepers such as analysts, auditors, rating agencies and lawyers, changes in 
compensation structure of businesses generally resulting in more emphasis on 
equity compensation, a market bubble that muted investor responses to 
overvalued companies, changes in corporate governance practices generally, 
aggressive earnings management by Enron managers and Enron corporate 
culture.358 
355 Tonge et al., supra note 352, at 21. 
356 See McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 144-146; Flynn McRoberts, The Fall of Andersen,
CHIG. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2002), at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-
0209010315sep01,1,1705920.story?coll=chi-businessbiztravel-utl; Flynn McRoberts, A Civil War 
Splits Andersen, CHIG. TRIB. (Sept. 2, 2002), at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-
0209020071sep02,1,2033601.story?coll=chi-businessbiztravel-utl; Flynn McRoberts, Ties To 
Enron Blinded Andersen, CHIG. TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2002), at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-0209030210sep03,1,657342.story?coll=chi-
businessbiztravel-utl; Flynn McRoberts, Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, CHIG. TRIB. (Sept. 4, 
2002), at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-
0209040368sep04,1,7342030.story?coll=chi-businessbiztravel-utl; Greg Farrell, Andersen Papers 
Lost in Sunbeam Case, U.S.A. TODAY (Jan. 30, 2002), at 
http://cgi.usatoday.com/money/energy/2002-01-31-andersen-sunbeam.htm#more. 
357 See supra notes 338 to 345 and accompanying text. 
358 Id. at 308 (giving general evaluation of primary explanations for Enron and other financial 
scandals of late 1990s); Macey, supra note 353 (discussing disclosure and efficient capital markets 
considerations with respect to Enron collapse); Yaniv Grinstein, Complementary Perspectives on 
“Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron,” 89 CORNELL L. REV. 503 (2004) 
(discussing Macey efficient markets and disclosure discussion); William S. Lerach, Plundering 
America: How American Investors Got Taken for Trillions by Corporate Insiders—The Rise of the 
New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 69, 104-125 (2002) (discussing lessons 
learned from Enron and WorldCom); Rhode & Patton, supra note 349 (discussing the role of 
lawyers in Enron collapse); McLean & Elkind, supra note 98 (giving overview of the rise and fall 
of Enron); Bethany McLean, Why Enron Went Bust, FORTUNE (Dec. 24, 2001) (discussing the 
principal factors behind Enron’s fall); Ronald R. Simms, & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics 
(Or: Culture Matters More Than Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243 (2003) (discussing the role of 
Enron corporate culture); Mark Jickling, The Enron Collapse: An Overview of Financial Issues 
(Mar. 28, 2003), CRS Report for Congress RS21135 (giving overview of the accounting and other 
factors underlying fall of Enron); Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of 
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Although Enron’s collapse was caused by a number of factors, perceptions of 
Enron as evident in its market valuation and Fortune accolades were likely tied to 
Enron’s sophisticated representations of economic reality through framing.  This 
framing served to establish the particular framework within which Enron 
communicated information about the company to various audiences.  Such 
framing also made liberal use of intangibles paradigm discourse combined with 
impenetrable financial statement presentations and extensive financial 
manipulation and fraud.359 Enron’s operation within the intangibles paradigm at 
the level of discourse, at least, was a key factor in its ability to transform its image 
from that a pipeline company into a new economy exemplary. 
In the 10 years following its formation in 1985, Enron transformed itself from an 
owner of natural gas pipelines into a highly leveraged trading operation.360 A key 
element of Enron’s ability to conduct its business during this time period was 
connected to its receiving permission from the SEC to adopt mark-to-market 
accounting methods for its energy contracts.361 Mark-to-market accounting 
enabled Enron to become a trading and financial deal-making company.362 Enron 
used mark-to-market accounting aggressively to recognize revenue for future 
claims under contracts and other types of transactions.363 Valuation of such 
claims, contracts and transactions was based on assumed fair values.  These fair 
values were often made based on quite questionable criteria and were also subject 
to manipulation.364 Enron also typically only made positive adjustments and 
 
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1145 (2003) (discussing the role of rating agencies at Enron); JULIA K. 
BRAZELTON & JANICE L. AMMONS, EDS., ENRON & BEYOND: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF 
ACCOUNTING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND SECURITIES ISSUES (2002); McLean & Elkind, 
supra note 98. 
359 See infra notes 360 to 368. 
360 Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 169 (Nancy B. Rappaport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) (noting that at its core 
Enron was a derivatives trading firm). 
361 Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and Key 
Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 97, 104 (Nancy B. 
Rappaport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 39-42; C. William 
Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, J. ACCOUNTANCY (Apr. 2002) (noting Enron’s lack of 
transparency in reporting its financial affairs), available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/apr2002/thomas.htm. 
362 Dharan & Bufkins, supra note 361, at 104 (noting that mark-to-market accounting was the 
genesis of Enron’s transformation into a trading and financial deal making firm); Partnoy, supra 
note 360, at 169; Thomas, supra note 361 (noting unprecedented scale of Enron’s use of mark-to-
market accounting). 
363 Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons form a Perfect Storm of Financial 
Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Cultural Failures, 39 CAL. W.L. REV. 163 (2003). 
364 Benston, supra note 52, at 1348 (noting that fair values are readily manipulated). 
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frequently neglected to make even clearly necessary write-downs of assets.365 
Enron also established SPEs intentionally structured to remove debt from Enron’s 
balance sheet, 366 thus removing two-thirds of Enron’s debt from its balance 
sheet.367 Enron in fact used derivatives and SPEs to manipulate its financial 
statements in three ways, all of which entailed using mark-to-market accounting 
to inflate Enron’s financial statements.368 
Although Enron’s primary money making operations were those of a speculative 
derivatives trading operation,369 Enron did not want to be valued like a trading 
operation, which trade at lower valuations.370 Instead, Enron took advantage of 
the increasingly prevalent intangibles paradigm discourse of the mid- and late 
1990s in an attempt to position itself as a new economy company and thus receive 
a new economy company valuation.371 It also launched business operations and 
practices such as Enron Online and Enron Broadband to take advantage of 
existing market conditions that gave higher valuations to new economy 
companies.  Enron Online, for example, was a trading system that Enron 
developed for its energy trading business:   
 
365 See McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 128 (noting that Enron delayed recording losses by 
refusing to write off dead deals). 
366 Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate 
Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309 (2002). 
367 Macey, supra note 353, at 419. 
368 Enron hid losses on technology stocks, concealed huge debts incurred to finance unprofitable 
new businesses and inflated the value of other troubled assets.  See Portnoy, supra note 362, at 
171; see also THE POWERS REPORT, supra note 98. 
369 See Portnoy, supra note 360, at 183. 
370 See McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 126 (noting that companies with primarily trading 
businesses trade at low stock valuations); Enron at its peak traded at 70 times earnings, which is 
significantly higher than the 20 times earnings that an established and well regarded investment 
banking and trading firm, such as Goldman Sachs, trades.  Tonge et al., supra note 352, at 5. 
371 Although he is described as a Luddite, “Skilling touted broadband as the Next Big Thing for 
Enron . . . If Skilling was going to get Enron an Internet-style valuation—and there was nothing he 
wanted more—he’d have to convince Wall Street that Enron was becoming, at least in part, an 
Internet company.  He may not have known how to surf the Web, but the relationship between the 
Internet and the stock market was something he understood all too well.” McLean & Elkind, supra 
note 98, at 184-185. 
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The story of the creation of Enron Online became an instant corporate 
legend and a key part of the Enron myth, testimony to how Enron’s culture 
fostered an entrepreneurial spirit that was at the root of the company’s 
success . . . It also helped that EOL [Enron Online] was unveiled at the 
height of the Internet mania, when any business conducted online had to be 
a good thing, almost by definition. 372 
Enron also described itself as a culture that “supported innovation” in common 
with the then high flying dot-coms.373 
Enron basically engaged in heavy intangibles paradigm discourse, which was 
misleading and deceptive, because Enron did not invest in research and 
development that would reflect or explain the magnitude of the intangibles it 
claimed to have.374 Evidence that precipitated Enron’s downfall had in fact been 
disclosed publicly by Enron.375 Potential gatekeepers that might have detected 
Enron’s fraud appear to have been captivated by the impressions that Enron 
sought to instill through intangibles paradigm discourse and framing.  
Consequently, gatekeepers and others frequently accepted Enron’s assertions with 
little critical scrutiny.  When Enron unveiled its broadband strategy at its annual 
analysts meeting on January 19 and 20, 2000, Enron’s performance included a 
surprise guest, Scott McNealy, President of Sun Microsystems, who announced 
Enron’s purchase of 18,000 Sun routers for its network.376 During the second day 
of the meeting, Enron’s stock price had risen by 26 percent within the course of 
the day.377 Time to reflect did not make analysts look more critically at their 
assessments of Enron and the reactions can only be described as euphoric.378 
Although some analysts did complain about how difficult Enron’s financial 
statements were to read,379 it was not until well into 2001 that serious questions 
 
372 Id. at 222. 
373 Id. at 118, 121 (noting that “[m]uch of what Skilling was selling had the effect of positioning 
Enron as a company that had more in common with the dot-coms than with an old energy giant 
like Exxon”). 
374 See Lev, supra note 2. 
375 McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 407 (noting that “there was more than enough on the 
public records to raise the hackles of any self-respecting analyst.”). 
376 Id. at 243. 
377 Id. at 244. 
378 Id. (noting that Merrill Lynch’s analyst Donato Eassey stated “[a]lthough this is an energy 
company, in our view, Enron fits the description of a ‘New Economy’ stock . . .”); O’Reilly, supra 
note 352. 
379 One analyst noted that Enron operated as a “giant hedge fund” without disclosing that risk in 
SEC filings.  Jennings, supra note 363, at 195. 
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began to be raised about Enron’s financial status and the fact that no one really 
understood how Enron’s business actually worked.380 
In addition to benefiting from the hype associated with the Internet boom, the 
management of Enron was also good at selling particular representations of Enron 
that were directed toward an audience that was happy to receive Enron’s 
representations with an exceedingly noncritical eye.  Jeffrey Skilling, the COO for 
a long period of time and more briefly the CEO, was in particular a “master 
presenter.”381 
Enron’s framing, both through presentations and actions, enabled it to maintain a 
high stock price, at least for a while, which can itself alone serve an important 
purpose for companies.382 In the end, however, even the best presentations were 
not enough to sustain a company with chaotic operations sustained for years by 
fraudulent accounting and reliance on manipulative intangibles paradigm 
discourse rather than competent business practices.383 
B. Integrating ICTs: The Wal-Mart Distribution System 
In contrast to Enron, Wal-Mart’s representations of economic reality and its 
engagement with the intangibles paradigm appear to be more accurate depictions 
of Wal-Mart’s actual business practices.  Wal-Mart, the world’s largest retailer,384 
380 Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced? FORTUNE (Mar. 5, 2001) (characterizing Enron’s 
business as a black box and noting that for all the lavish attention that Enron received, how Enron 
actually made money remained impenetrable to outsiders); McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 
318-323 (noting that questions were first asked about Enron in the fall of 2000 in Texas Journal, a
regional Wall Street Journal supplement, in an article the focused on mark to market accounting 
and Fortune in the winter of 2001, leading short sellers to begin shorting Enron stock); Bethany 
McLean, Ken, Lay Your Cards on the Table, FORTUNE (Nov. 12, 2001) (noting that questions 
continue to exist about the true profitability of Enron’s core energy trading business); see also Bret 
Farrell & Del Jones, How Did Enron Come Unplugged, USA TODAY (Jan. 14, 2002); Jonathan D. 
Glater, Enron’s Many Strands Accounting, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2002). 
381 McLean & Elkind, supra note 98, at 233. 
382 See Daniel C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate 
Irresponsiblity and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 972 (2002) (“As Enron 
shows, a high stock price has an independent competitive purpose – it provides an acquisition 
currency and a source of collateral that can be used to facilitate substantial (often hidden) 
leveraging . . Also, and perhaps more subtly, stock price is a metric by which to test the success of 
the control group currently in power in a firm with much hard-to-measure value, and hence goes 
deeply to their sense of identity.”) 
383 See generally McLean & Elkind, supra note 98. 
384 See Stephen J. Arnold & John Fernie, Wal-Mart in Europe: Prospects for the UK, 17 INT’L
MARKETING REV. 416, 416 (2000) (noting number of Wal-Mart employees); WAL-MART 2004 
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is the biggest company and employer in the United States,385 with some 1.3 
million employees and fiscal year 2004 revenues of more than $256 billion.386 
Although it is not in the ICT sector, Wal-Mart has been an early adopter of 
technology in its business operations. Wal-Mart was one of the first retail 
companies to introduce a comprehensive logistic system in its stores, spending 
more than $1 billion on information technology. 387 This investment permitted 
Wal-Mart to process orders directly from retail stores to suppliers based on actual 
sales.  This investment thus enabled Wal-Mart to replace inventory with a just in 
time delivery system based on the information provided through its logistics 
system.388 
Wal-Mart has throughout its history made significant investments in technology 
to minimize costs and facilitate management.389 Wal-Mart began installing a 
satellite system that enabled stores to communicate with Wal-Mart headquarters 
and computerized the company’s distribution system in 1976.390 By the early 
1990s, this communication system had developed into Retail-Link, which 
provides point of sale data on sales trends and inventories of the suppliers’ 
products on a store by store basis.391 Wal-Mart’s distribution and 
communications systems are built in-house. 392 The Retail Link system cost Wal-
Mart an estimated $4 billion to develop.393 
Companies such as Wal-Mart, Dell and Cisco have used technology to redefine 
the nature of relationships with their suppliers.  Both Dell and Wal-Mart have 
focused on maintaining low inventories and streamlining distribution processes so 
as to cut costs that can be passed on to customers.394 Wal-Mart’s computer 
systems track a myriad of information and require that suppliers use the same 
system.  As a result, Wal-Mart has made technology a core competency.395 
ANNUAL REPORT (2004), at 13 (stating that revenues were more than $256 billion for the fiscal 
year ended January 31, 2004). 
385 Cora Daniels, Women vs. Wal-Mart, FORTUNE (July 21, 2003) 
386 Cora Daniels, Up Unions vs. Wal-Mart, FORTUNE (May 17, 2004). 
387 Daum, supra note 65, at 14. 
388 Id.
389 See Sandra S. Vance & Roy V. Scott, Sam Walton and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.: A Study in 
Modern Southern Entrepreneurship, 58 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 231, 242 (1992) (noting that Wal-Mart 
invested in an IBM 370/135 computer system in the mid-1970s for inventory control, payroll and 
other financial records and to obtain statistical data about store sales).  
390 America’s Most Admired Companies, FORTUNE (Mar. 1, 1999). 
391 Arnold & Fernie, supra note 384, at 422. 
392 America’s Most Admired Companies, supra note 390. 
393 Arnold & Fernie, supra note 384, at 422. 
394 America’s Most Admired Companies, supra note 390. 
395 Id.
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Despite the greater accuracy of Wal-Mart’s representations of economic reality 
and fact that technology is a core feature of Wal-Mart’s business, specific 
disclosure with respect to ICTs and intangibles is minimal in Wal-Mart financial 
statements.  The role of ICTs and intangibles is consequently not transparent and 
is thus hard to verify.  The estimated $4 billion Wal-Mart spent on its technology 
and communications systems is not recorded on its balance sheet.  Wal-Mart 
income statements, which may contain expenses incurred during the time period 
covered by the statement, do not break out these expenses separately or indicate 
the magnitude of such expenses.  As a result, public information about Wal-Mart 
in magazine and academic articles at times provides more information about the 
company’s principal intangibles than do Wal-Mart’s financials statements and 
disclosures. 
V. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS: IMPLEMENTING DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
The intangibles paradigm raises a host of issues with respect to existing regulatory 
frameworks, including in relation to securities disclosure, accounting and 
financial reporting, capital requirements and tax laws.  The reforms precipitated 
by Enron and other corporate scandals did not really touch upon the core of 
operation of the intangibles paradigm that underlay many of the activities that 
such reforms were intended to address.  In addition, such reforms do not address 
the distortions in the representation of economic reality evident in financial 
statement reporting and other company disclosures that have been one 
characteristic of the intangibles paradigm.  Although reform of existing regulatory 
structures is needed, such reform would also notably play an important role in 
providing behavioral incentives by setting standards upon which private 
enforcement of established standards is based.396 Such private enforcement is 
quite important since the SEC, for example, is constrained by resources.  Much 
enforcement of GAAP is actually done by corporations and their Boards of 
Directors.397 
As then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt noted in 1998, “[t]he significance of 
transparent, timely and reliable financial statements and its importance to investor 
 
396 See Hemang Desai, Chris E. Hogan & Michael S. Wilkins, The Reputational Penalty for 
Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover (Aug. 2004), available 
at 07.36.165.114/NewOrleans/Papers/1401148.pdf (noting importance of private penalties and 
enforcement of GAAP rules); Denton Collins, Austin L. Reitenga & Juan Manuel Sanchez-
Cuevas, Managerial Consequences of Earnings Restatements (Oct. 2004), available at 
business.utsa.edu/departments/ acc/arc/papers/CR_Draft.pdf (looking at penalties given to 
managers connected to earnings restatements). 
397 See supra note 396 and accompanying text. 
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protection have never been more apparent.”398 Moving existing securities 
disclosure and accounting frameworks fully into the knowledge economy will 
help ensure that financial statements and company representations of economic 
reality and disclosures with respect to intangibles provide information that is 
transparent, reliable and relevant to company operations. 
A. The Intangibles Haze and Corporate Governance 
The intangibles paradigm represents a potential challenge to corporate governance 
structures because of the uncertainty and greater risk of intangibles.399 This is 
particularly true for members of the Board of Directors, who may not be well-
equipped or given adequate information to understand fully the implications of 
business practices under the intangibles paradigm.  Conducting due diligence with 
intangibles may also often be different than is required in the case of physical 
assets.  
In addition, since so many intangibles are generated internally within companies, 
understanding something of the nature of such intangibles requires that the 
company itself have an accurate assessment of the contribution of such 
intangibles to company operations.  Such notions of value can be difficult to 
penetrate and evaluate effectively.  In addition, both internal and external 
understandings have the potential to be skewed or distorted as a result of 
intangibles paradigm practices and discourse.  Since our current corporate law 
system is largely based on self-regulation, the implications for the intangibles 
haze for corporate governance are potentially quite profound.400 
The potential negative consequences of intangibles paradigm business practices 
for members of the Board of Directors has been underscored recently by recent 
proposed settlements by board members at Enron and WorldCom that entailed 
payments by such board members out of their personal assets.401 Not 
 
398 Levitt, supra note 338. 
399 Cf GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 55-56 (discussing the relationship between corporate governance and 
accounting oversight). 
400 Bratton, supra note 33, at 1024 (“In our self-regulatory system of corporate law, the job of 
insisting on trustworthy numbers devolves in the first instance on the gatekeepers.”). 
401 See Jonathan D. Glater, A Big New Worry for Corporate Directors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6. 2005 
(discussing $18 million out of pocket settlement from personal assets by board members of 
WorldCom to settle a securities class action suit); Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Directors Chip In on 
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9. 2005 (noting that a group of 10 former directors of  Enron “have 
agreed to pay $13 million out of their own pockets as part of a $168 million settlement of a lawsuit 
brought by onetime shareholders who lost billions of dollars in the company's collapse in 2001”); 
Gretchen Morgenson, If Corporate Directors Snooze, Now They May Lose, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9. 
2005, at 3 (noting that WorldCom directors agreed to pay one-fifth of their aggregate net worth in 
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uncoincidentally, both of these companies were closely involved in financial 
statement misrepresentations and intangibles paradigm business practices or 
discourse.  Despite the fact that board members have agreed to settlements out of 
pocket, such settlements are in and of themselves unlikely to provide significant 
behavioral incentives for board members to focus on clearing the intangibles 
haze.402 This is because any behavioral incentives provided by such settlements 
may be more than offset by the fact that board members may also profit from 
misrepresentations of economic reality in financial statements and disclosures by 
virtue of their stock ownership in the company making such representations.403 
B. Incorporating Intangibles in Financial Statements: Measuring the 
Financial Impact of Intangibles 
Current accounting practices and procedures as embodied in GAAP do not 
adequately measure intangibles or sufficiently contemplate the implications of the 
intangibles paradigm for existing measurements.404 Financial statements that 
reflect greater recognition of the intangibles paradigm are a first step in 
addressing the intangibles haze. The institutional structure of the accounting 
profession and accounting regulation make changes in GAAP often contested and 
difficult.405 This, combined with the fact that auditors and inside management 
often engage in rent seeking behavior complicates any attempt to regulate 
financial reporting and GAAP.406 Despite this fact, additional disclosure about 
intangibles would improve the accuracy of financial statements’ representations 
of economic reality and provide additional information that may help minimize 
opportunities for fraud that currently exist with respect to intangibles paradigm 
 
the settlement); Editorial, Directors on Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8. 2005 (discussing WorldCom 
settlement). 
402 Lucian Bebchuk, What’s $13 Million Among Friends?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005 (noting that 
despite the Enron settlement, board members are not really being held accountable in any way 
because the 10 directors, who sold Enron shares worth more than $250 million during the period 
of Enron’s financial statement misrepresentations, are being permitted to pay 10 percent of such 
directors’ pretax profits and keep the remaining 90 percent or $117 million).  
403 Id.
404 See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection:  The 
SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1139, 1147 (2003) (“Orthodox 
accounting does not apply well at all to intangibles like human and intellectual capital, or to the 
new style methods of creating and selling products and services.”). 
405 Bratton, supra note 33, at 1038 (“GAAP is a body of law structurally shielded from outside 
inspection.  Monitoring GAAP is difficult—to stay abreast of substantive issues in accounting is to 
be a member of the guild in the first place.”). 
406 Id. at 1026 (“Absent antecedent institutional reform that ensures auditor independence and 
lessens the negative impact of rent-seeking and influence activity on audit quality, perverse effects 
could follow”). 
Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy 80 
 Draft of 9:27 AM, 3/11/06 
 Do Not Cite or Distribute 
Copyright 2006 
discourse and company framing.  This would in turn help make financial 
statements more transparent and reliable. 
As a first step to address the intangibles haze, companies should be required to 
make additional financial reporting disclosures about intangibles under GAAP.407 
Companies should be required to specifically identify and disclose, for example, 
the principal intangible resources and assets they use, the implications and 
significance of such intangibles and the potential consequences of loss of value 
with respect to such intangibles.  Disclosure should also be made concerning the 
magnitude and specific nature of the contribution of intangibles to assets, 
liabilities, revenues and expenses. 
These disclosures should focus on four core aspects of the use of intangibles in 
business operations: intangibles numbers, balance sheet impact, revenue impact 
and expense effect.  Such statements should demonstrate results over the same 
time periods as GAAP requires with respect to company financial statements 
generally.   
The first aspect of such statements would be the disclosure of actual numbers 
relating to intangibles.  Companies should be required to give an overall picture of 
the uses and role of intangibles in company operations.  In addition, companies 
should be required to specifically assess the financial statement impact of the 
intangibles that they have disclosed.  The balance sheet impact portion of the 
intangibles financial statement would assess the financial reporting impact of 
differential accounting treatment of intangibles.  It would disclose how 
capitalization as opposed to expensing intangibles would influence financial 
reporting for the applicable periods.  This would thus require sensitivity testing as 
to the nature and impact of particular accounting choices with respect to 
intangibles.  For example, a company that has certain research and development 
expenditures, would need to disclose with much more detail the specific nature of 
such expenditures.  Such disclosures would need to be balanced against 
reasonable needs for companies to not disclose confidential or proprietary 
information or trade secrets.  In addition to disclosing greater information about 
such expenditures, the company would be need to show the financial statement 
impact of accounting decisions with respect to such expenditures.  In the case of 
research and development expenditures that were treated as operating expenses, 
the company would need to show the balance sheet and income statement impact 
if such expenditures were treated as capital expenses.   
 
407 This proposal contemplates a separate intangibles financial statement.  However, a separate 
statement is not absolutely necessary, and the requirements for such a statement could be 
incorporated into existing requirements for financial statements. 
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In addition to disclosing more information about the nature of intangible 
expenditures and the effects of treating such expenditures as capital or operating 
expenses, companies should also be required to disclose the specific contribution 
of intangibles to company revenues and expenses.  This would mean, for 
example, with respect to the research and development expenditures noted above, 
that companies would need to disclose the revenue impact of the expenditures 
associated with that particular intangibles expenses, regardless of whether an 
intangible expense is treated as a capital or operating expense.  Companies would 
thus be required, for example, to disclose in far greater detail information about 
both revenues and expenses in connection with research and development, which 
is often currently reported as a line item in a company’s expenses on the income 
statement. 
In addition to greater disclosure with respect to intangibles, GAAP accounting 
rules should be modified such as to minimize the differential treatment of tangible 
and intangible assets.  One proposal for dealing with the differential treatment of 
tangible and intangible assets is to implement an accounting regime in which all 
intangible investments with attributable benefits that have met certain feasibility 
tests are recognized as assets.408 Selective capitalization of research and 
development expenses may increase the usefulness of accounting measures both 
statistically and economically.409 Studies suggest that a selective approach may 
work better than any blanket policy with respect to treatment of expenses 
associated with intangibles.410 An approach that includes specific measurements 
and disclosure with regard to intangibles might also address some of the 
 
408 See, e.g, Lev, supra note 18, at 124-125.  
409 See Dennis Chambers, Ross Jennings & Robert B. Thompson II, Evidence on the Usefulness of 
Capitalizing and Amortizing Research and Development Costs (August 2000), Carnegie Mellon 
University, Carnegie Mellon Accounting Mini-Conference, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=58661; 
Dennis Chambers, Ross Jennings & Robert B. Thompson II, Managerial Discretion and 
Accounting for Research and Development Costs (December 2001), Working Paper, at 
www.stern.nyu.edu/ross/Chambers.pdf.
410 See, e.g., Baruch Lev, Doron Nissim & Jacob Thomas, On The Informational Usefulness of 
R&D Capitalization and Amortization (March 15, 2002), Working Paper (suggesting that policy 
of treating research and development expenses as capital expenses would be beneficial), at 
www.som.yale.edu/Faculty/jkt7/papers/r&d.pdf; S.P. Kothari, Ted E. Laguerre & Andrew J. 
Leone, Capitalization versus Expensing: Evidence on the Uncertainty of Future Earnings from 
Capital Expenditures versus R&D Outlays (May 2001), Working Paper, at 
http://web.mit.edu/kothari/www/attach/klR&D%20pap%20May%20%202001.pdf; Charles Shi, 
On the Trade-off between the Future Benefits and Riskiness of R&D: A Bondholders’ Perspective,
35 J. ACCOUNTING ECON. & FIN. 227 (2003) (noting that from a bondholders’ perspective, the 
variance effects or risk of research and development outweigh mean effects, suggesting that 
bondholders see them as less like assets and more as useful measures of risk and indicating that 
findings do not buttress FASB’s research and development expensing rule). 
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distortions and discrepancies that have become characteristic of financial 
statements under the intangibles paradigm. 
Similar disclosures should be made in the aggregate for all intangibles as well as 
individually for specifically identified intangibles such as research and 
development expenses for specific projects or products, and intangibles whose 
impairment could have an impact on the company’s operations or stock market 
value.  Such financial statement reporting requirements should be combined with 
additional disclosure requirements for companies from a securities law 
perspective. 
C. Intangibles Securities Disclosure Framework: Securities Regulation in the 
Knowledge Economy 
The intangibles paradigm presents significant challenges to existing securities 
regulation frameworks that are based on an ethos of disclosure as a core aspect of 
the operation of securities markets.411 Securities laws have developed under an 
assumption that a continuous disclosure system helps ensure that securities 
markets are fair and honest.412 The intangibles paradigm has contributed to 
financial statement obfuscation and caused existing disclosures to vary at times 
significantly from underlying economic reality.  As a result a key question 
presented by the intangibles paradigm from the perspective of securities laws is 
how to incorporate greater and more focused disclosure about intangibles into 
required company disclosures.413 
An intangibles securities disclosure framework, which is a companion to the 
intangibles financial statement reporting requirements discussed herein, represents 
a potentially important step in incorporating greater recognition of intangibles 
within existing securities frameworks. Current disclosure requirements with 
respect to real property in Regulation S-K Items 102 are based upon assumptions 
 
411 The legislative debate preceding passage of the Securities Act demonstrates that a primary 
purpose of the Securities Act was to protect investors by providing them with clear and adequate 
disclosure concerning securities they purchased.  See 77 CONG. REC. 2910-2924 (1933). 
412 Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 under the Securities Act of 1933—“Transactions by an Issuer 
Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering,” Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 1974 SEC 
LEXIS 3297 (Apr. 23, 1974). 
413 See Langevoort, supra note 404, at 1154 (noting that clearer and more focused disclosure 
requirements will in general lessen the opportunity for “violation by rationalization” and may lead 
to more careful attention by gatekeepers). 
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about tangibles paradigm company operations. 414 Such requirements need to be 
updated to reflect the reality of the intangibles paradigm.  Since the SEC has 
historically been at the forefront of enforcement of emerging accounting issues,415 
specific SEC policies for intangibles would be of enormous value in setting 
coherent standards for disclosure with respect to intangibles.  In addition, the 
institutional structure of the accounting profession makes regulatory intervention 
from the SEC perspective all the more important.416 
The implications of intangibles within existing securities law rules should also be 
considered.  Under existing securities law standards, companies take care in 
making public disclosures about information contained in securities law filings.417 
This means that a company would be unlikely, for example, to report financial 
statement numbers in an SEC filing and then issue a press release with numbers 
that are materially different than those in the SEC filing.  Company disclosures 
about intangibles are at times not currently rooted to the same extent within 
existing securities law frameworks as are disclosures in other areas with respect to 
tangible assets.  This is clearly reflected in the operation of intangibles paradigm 
discourse.  One core element of intangibles paradigm discourse has been 
assertions by companies with respect to intangibles about which no specific 
disclosure may currently be required.  This has been true in the case of fraudulent 
disclosures such as those at Enron as well as informational disclosures by 
companies such as Cisco with respect to its virtual operation.418 When 
intangibles were less important, the current framework was perhaps manageable.  
With the proliferation of intangibles and the advent of the knowledge economy, 
more specific structures need to be developed for securities law disclosure 
requirements about intangibles. 
 
414 See Brookings Institution, Securities and Exchange Commission and Financial Reporting Sub-
Group Report, at http://www.brook.edu/es/research/projects/intangibles/doc/sub_sec.htm 
(hereinafter, “Brookings SEC Report”).   
415 Ehsan H. Feroz, Kyungjoo Park & Victor S. Pastena, The Financial and Market Effects of the 
SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, 29 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 107, 112 (1991) 
(noting that SEC enforcement actions pursue issues that touch on integrity of the disclosure 
system and emerging accounting problems). 
416 Bratton, supra note 33, at 1039 (noting that unlike the legal profession, “with accounting the 
advocacy merges into the numbers reported on the clients’ certified financials”). 
417 The Rule 10b-5 standard, which imposes securities law liabilities for any untrue statement or 
omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, is one reason companies often take 
care in issuing public statements about items disclosed in SEC filings.  See supra note 199. 
418 See supra notes 138 to 157 and accompanying text. 
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An intangibles securities law disclosure framework should begin with a 
requirement that the Management Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition 
and Results of Operation (“MD&A”) portion of required securities law 
disclosures includes a clear and detailed discussion of the role of intangibles 
within a company.419 The imposition of aggregate disclosures has been one 
recommendation made with respect to intangibles.420 Although aggregate 
disclosures, including disclosures concerning market capitalization and book 
value, are a step in the right direction, the focus of any intangibles disclosure 
requirements should encompass the aggregate contribution of intangibles to 
overall company operations, as well as the importance of individual intangibles 
that are significant drivers of company value.  This would mean more company 
disclosure and warnings with respect to material future risks that are often at the 
core of potential issues with intangibles paradigm business operations.  Current 
MD&A disclosure requirements in general and not just with respect to 
intangibles, “fail to make sufficiently principled distinctions and hence collapses 
into a muddle.”421 As a result, MD&A should move away from the current 
“reasonably likely” standard embedded therein to a framework that will give 
investors greater warning of both the probability and magnitude of material future 
risks.422 Incorporating disclosure standards for intangibles in securities law 
disclosure requirements is an important aspect of giving investors greater 
understanding and warning of material future risks with respect to intangibles.  
Such modifications of disclosure standards will represent the first step in moving 
securities law frameworks in a direction that reflects operation of the intangibles 
paradigm. 
 
419 Item 303 of Regulation S-K sets forth the requirements for MD&A disclosure.  See 17 C.F.R. § 
229.303 (2005).   
420 See Brookings SEC Report, supra note 414 (recommending that disclosures concerning 
intangibles be made on an aggregate rather than individual basis and that disclosures about market 
capitalization and book value be required). 
421 Langevoort, supra note 404, at 1155.   
422 Id. at 1155-1156. 
Measuring and Representing the Knowledge Economy 85 
 Draft of 9:27 AM, 3/11/06 
 Do Not Cite or Distribute 
Copyright 2006 
 CONCLUSION 
Breaking through the intangibles haze requires fundamental reassessment of 
accounting rules and legal regimes in light of actual business practice in the 
knowledge economy.  It also involves recognition of motivations of various actors 
that might be involved.  Such motivations might include maintaining a high stock 
price, personal gain, fraud or other factors.  The fundamental question of how 
intangibles should be treated in light of changing business practices remains an 
open one about which many different legitimate approaches may exist under 
current disclosure standards.  Unfortunately, these legitimate differences create a 
haze that also obscures illegitimate behavior such as Enron’s. 
Current debates highlight the fact that accounting and disclosure standards with 
respect to intangibles are increasingly important given the sources of value for the 
majority of companies today.  The fact that the treatment of intangibles is not 
addressed and such major sources of value remain subject to differential 
accounting treatment that makes financial statements less useful and often not 
reflective of underlying economic reality.  This tends to result in distortion of 
behavioral incentives and financial measures of performance.  To the extent that 
intangibles are not adequately dealt with, a vacuum exists with respect to 
companies’ use of intangibles that makes company framing and discourse much 
harder to evaluate.  The resulting haze is one that clearly needs to be addressed 
from the perspective of applicable legal and accounting regimes intended to 
govern business.  Addressing this haze will require more that merely altering 
particular rules or specific procedures, however.  Rather, it necessitates a focus on 
how to capture adequately contemporary business organization and practice in 
financial statements and required securities law disclosure such as to reveal 
information about companies that is relevant, material and representative of 
underlying economic reality.   
